Innovation Snowballing and Climate Law by Liscow, Zachary & Karpilow, Quentin
Washington University Law Review 
Volume 95 Issue 2 
2017 
Innovation Snowballing and Climate Law 
Zachary Liscow 
Yale Law School 
Quentin Karpilow 
Yale Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview 
 Part of the Energy and Utilities Law Commons, Environmental Law Commons, and the Intellectual 
Property Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Zachary Liscow and Quentin Karpilow, Innovation Snowballing and Climate Law, 95 WASH. U. L. REV. 387 
(2017). 
Available at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol95/iss2/7 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University Open 
Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington University Law Review by an authorized 
administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more information, please contact 
digital@wumail.wustl.edu. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
387 
INNOVATION SNOWBALLING 
 AND CLIMATE LAW 
 
ZACHARY LISCOW & QUENTIN KARPILOW* 
ABSTRACT 
Findings at the frontier of economics suggest startling implications of 
an under-appreciated fact about technological development: innovation 
builds on itself, developing path dependencies in which past innovations 
attract similar, but more advanced, innovations. Innovation snowballs. 
The world economy needs to undergo a dramatic transformation to avoid 
the risk of catastrophic effects from climate change. Policy to encourage 
this transformation should be sensitive to innovation snowballing. 
The conventional policy view has long been that, to address a social 
harm like pollution, the right response is simply to tax the behavior 
causing the harm, leading to a variety of responses including induced 
technological change. The Article shows that this view is incomplete. 
Rather, the most efficient response to climate change—and likely other 
social harms—requires a combination of taxes and a big push of 
government support to specifically redirect innovation toward 
technologies that alleviate social harm. Without a big push in cleantech 
innovation to change the trajectory of innovation, energy technology will 
tend to stay trapped in its high-pollution path. 
For climate policy and likely other pressing policy issues, the Article 
suggests a paradigm shift in the role of innovation policy: from broad to 
targeted. Otherwise, the transition to clean energy will be longer, more 
expensive, and riskier for the global climate. The Article shows how to 
efficiently deploy innovation policy to meet this challenge. 
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INTRODUCTION 
To address social harms like climate change, government policy should 
encourage innovation in targeted areas. That’s the simple point of this 
Article. The claim may seem obviously true—for example, that innovation 
policy should encourage innovations that reduce the risk of climate change 
over those that exacerbate the problem. But conventional law-and-
economics efficiency analysis opposes policies that seek to specifically 
incentivize innovation in certain areas, and argues instead that, if a party 
causes a social problem, the party should be taxed to discourage the 
activity but should not receive subsidies to develop innovations that would 
help reduce the social harm.1 New economics research overturns this view, 
based on what we call “innovation snowballing:” innovation builds on 
itself over time, developing path dependencies in which past innovations 
make present ones more valuable, with past innovations attracting similar, 
more advanced innovations.2 Thus, to maximize efficiency in the presence 
of innovation snowballing, innovation policy should target certain areas to 
address social problems, so that future innovation will follow the path 
toward reducing those social harms. This Article explains: (1) how 
conventional efficiency analysis disapproves of targeting innovation to 
address social problems, (2) why new economics research on innovation 
snowballing overturns that view, and (3) how policy should respond in the 
context of climate law—an area where innovation snowballing is 
particularly significant. 
Economic analysts agree that, for innovations that could exacerbate or 
mitigate a social harm, there are two potential reasons for government 
intervention. First, since society benefits from innovation to a greater 
extent than innovators themselves capture (partly because not all ideas can 
 
 
1. See William Nordhaus, Designing a Friendly Space for Technological Change to Slow 
Global Warming, 33 ENERGY ECON. 665, 665 (2011) (conducting a traditional efficiency analysis of 
innovation subsidies in the context of climate change). See, e.g., Jacob Kavkewitz, Jamming the 
Square Peg Through the Round Hole: EPA’s Options for Implementing Efficient Climate Change 
Regulation Under the Clean Air Act, 4 ARIZ. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 1001, 1006 (2013) (calling a global 
cap-and-trade system for carbon the “ideal solution”); Robert N. Stavins, A Meaningful U.S. Cap-and-
Trade System to Address Climate Change, 32 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 293 (2008); Yoram Margalioth, 
Tax Policy Analysis of Climate Change, 64 TAX L. REV. 63, 63–64 (2010) (framing climate change as 
an “efficiency problem” that can be solved by equating the private and social costs of greenhouse 
gases).  
2.  Daron Acemoglu has pioneered the economics research on innovation snowballing. See, e.g., 
Daron Acemoglu et al., Transition to Clean Technology, 124 J. POL. ECON. 52, 52 (2016) [hereinafter, 
Acemoglu et al., Transition]. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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be patented),3 innovators produce positive “externalities” for society.4 
Externalities can be positive (beneficial for society) or negative (harmful 
for society), and occur when the activities of one party makes another 
party better or worse off, but the first party does not bear those gains or 
losses.5 Because of these positive innovation externalities, innovation 
should be subsidized, to encourage the socially optimal amount of 
innovation.6 Technologies that produce social harms like greenhouse gas 
emissions also produce a second externality: a negative one, since these 
emissions increase climate risks.7 Because of these negative pollution 
externalities, the government should adopt some form of a carbon tax to 
discourage pollution. 
Though some have argued otherwise,8 the conventional view is that 
these twin externalities—positive for innovation and negative for 
pollution—are separable, rather than intertwined. In particular, 
government innovation policy should be equally supportive of private-
sector innovation in “cleantech” (technologies with low or no greenhouse 
gas emissions, like wind and solar) and “dirtytech” (fossil fuel 
technologies with significant greenhouse gas emissions and associated 
technologies, like fracking or deep sea oil drilling).9 In other words, the 
 
 
3.  See generally Bronwyn H. Hall, Jacques Mairesse & Pierre Mohnen, Measuring the Returns 
to R&D, in 2 HAND BOOK OF THE ECONOMICS OF INNOVATION 1033–82 (Bronwyn H. Hall & Nathan 
Rosenberg eds., 2010) (reviewing the theoretical and empirical literature on research and development 
spillovers). 
4.  Brett M. Frischmann & Mark A. Lemley, Spillovers, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 257, 257–58 
(2007) (discussing intellectual property law and innovation spillovers). 
5.  JONATHAN GRUBER, PUBLIC FINANCE AND PUBLIC POLICY 122 (4th ed. 2013). 
6.  Daniel J. Hemel & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Beyond the Patents-Prizes Debate, 92 TEX. L. 
REV. 303, 327 (2013) (explaining the advantages and disadvantages of different innovation 
instruments in addressing standard innovation spillovers). 
7.  INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2014 SYNTHESIS 
REPORT: SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS 6–13 (describing the negative impacts of climate change on 
ecosystems and societies across the globe); Tamma A. Carleton & Solomon M. Hsiang, Social and 
Economic Impacts of Climate, 353 SCI. aad9837-1, aad9837-9–aad9837-10 (2016) (summarizing the 
empirical literature on the agricultural, economic, health, and social impacts of climate change); 
COMM. ON ASSESSING APPROACHES TO UPDATING THE SOC. COST OF CARBON ET AL., ASSESSMENT 
OF APPROACHES TO UPDATING THE SOCIAL COST OF CARBON: PHASE 1 REPORT ON A NEAR-TERM 
UPDATE 1–2 (discussing estimates of the social cost of carbon, which measures the discounted 
economic costs of emitting greenhouse gases into the atmosphere). 
8.  Reuven S. Avi-Yonah & David M. Uhlmann, Combating Global Climate Change: Why a Carbon 
Tax Is a Better Response to Global Warming than Cap and Trade, 28 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3, 41 (2009) 
(calling for cleantech tax credits to address the positive externalities associated with research and 
development); Margalioth, supra note 1, at 88 (arguing that cleantech innovation spillovers justify 
“subsidies or government grants for research in the area of alternative clean energy sources”); David 
E. Adelman & Kirsten H. Engel, Reorienting State Climate Change Policies To Induce Technological 
Change, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 835, 847–57 (2008) (justifying the adoption of cleantech innovation policies 
by states on the existence of positive innovation spillovers).  
9.  Indeed, legal scholars have long expressed skepticism toward the government “picking 
winners” to encourage innovation in some technologies over others. See, e.g., Adam B. Jaffe, Richard 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol95/iss2/7
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government should not attempt to directly influence the direction of 
technological development. Rather, it should tax pollution, provide 
technology-neutral innovation support, and then let the cards lay where 
they fall, trusting the private sector to respond in the cheapest, most 
efficient way. By this logic, for example, new wind technologies and new 
fracking technologies should receive the same government support. The 
reasoning is simple: the innovation subsidy corrects for the innovation 
externality, which is produced by both wind and fracking innovation, and 
the pollution tax corrects for the pollution externality. So there is no need 
for additional subsidies for cleantech innovation. 
This traditional argument is reflected in a wide swath of economic 
analysis on climate change, as well as an international climate regime that 
encourages reductions in greenhouse gas emissions, but does not try to do 
so through targeted innovation.10 However, new research shows that this 
view is misguided and that, as a result, policymakers are failing to use the 
most efficient, cheapest, quickest, and most effective tools to reduce the 
 
 
G. Newell & Robert N. Stavins, A Tale of Two Market Failures: Technology and Environmental 
Policy, 54 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 164, 169 (2005) (“There is a strong strain in the economic analysis of 
technology policy of avoiding choosing particular technical areas for support, that is ‘picking 
winners.’”) (emphasis omitted); RICHARD A. POSNER, CATASTROPHE: RISK AND RESPONSE 160 (2004) 
(expressing “well known” skepticism about the government picking technological winners); Jonathan 
H. Adler, Eyes on a Climate Prize: Rewarding Energy Innovation to Achieve Climate Stabilization, 35 
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 37 (2011) (arguing that the government is ill-equipped to identify and 
efficiently subsidize promising new technologies); David Weisbach, Designing Subsidies for Low-
Carbon Energy, 20 J. ENVTL. & SUSTAINABILITY L. 1, 15 (2013). In the environmental law context, 
the question of picking winners often comes up implicitly or explicitly in analyses comparing the 
efficiency of command-and-control regulations and pollution taxes. See, e.g., Bruce A. Ackerman & 
Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1333, 1342–43 (1985); Richard 
B. Stewart, Regulation, Innovation, and Administrative Law: A Conceptual Framework, 69 CALIF. L. 
REV. 1256, 1262–64 (1981); Cass R. Sunstein, Paradoxes of the Regulatory State, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 
407, 420 (1990); Nathaniel O. Keohane, Richard L. Revesz & Robert N. Stavins, The Choice of 
Regulatory Instruments in Environmental Policy, 22 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 313, 313–14 (1998). 
10.  See, e.g., Richard J. Pierce, Jr. The Past, Present, and Future of Energy Regulation, 31 
UTAH ENVTL. L. REV. 291, 299–300 (2011); Ann E. Carlson, Designing Effective Climate Policy: 
Cap-and-Trade and Complementary Policies, 49 HARV. J. LEGIS. 207, 240 (2012); Richard B. Stewart, 
A New Generation of Environmental Regulation?, 29 CAP. U. L. REV. 21, 173 (2001); Margalioth, 
supra note 1, at 63–64; Daniel C. Esty & Steve Charnovitz, Green Rules to Drive Innovation, HARV. 
BUS. REV., Mar. 2012, at 121. This conventional view also permeates media portrayals of the global 
warming problem. See, e.g., David Kestenbaum, Economists Have a One-Page Solution to Climate 
Change, NPR, (June 28, 2013, 3:46 AM http://www.npr.org/sections/money/2013/06/28/196355493/ 
economists-have-a-one-page-solution-to-climate-change; Henry M. Paulson Jr., Opinion, The Coming 
Climate Crash, N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 2014, at SR1, available at https://www.nytimes.com/2014/06 
/22/opinion/sunday/lessons-for-climate-change-in-the-2008-recession.html?_r=0; Paul Krugman, 
Building a Green Economy, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 7, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/11/magaz 
ine/11Economy-t.html; Alan S. Blinder, Commentary, The Carbon Tax Miracle Cure, WALL ST. J. 
(Jan. 31, 2011), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748703893104576108610681576914. 
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risk of a climate catastrophe.11 
Specifically, the conventional view misses the dynamics of 
innovation.12 Its understanding of how innovation occurs over time is too 
simple. In short, it misses innovation snowballing. Suppose that an 
innovator comes up with a blockbuster technology making solar energy 
cheaper than energy from fossil fuels. In this scenario, conventional 
economic analysis assumes that innovation rates in cleantech and dirtytech 
will remain unchanged. Thus, more solar cells will be produced after the 
blockbuster innovation, but the breakthrough solar technology does not 
fundamentally alter the processes underlying innovation in cleantech and 
dirtytech. As a result, under the conventional framework, innovation in 
cleantech and dirtytech will chug along at the same pace as if the 
breakthrough had never occurred. 
This conventional assumed response of innovation is likely incorrect. 
Instead, if there is a blockbuster solar innovation, innovators will flock to 
solar and away from dirtytech because solar is now the cheapest 
technology, meaning new solar innovations can be immediately 
commercialized for a larger number of users. Follow-up solar innovations 
will only further reduce the costs of solar and attract even more innovators 
from dirtytech to cleantech, accelerating cleantech innovation even more. 
Innovation in solar will, in other words, snowball, gathering speed, mass, 
and momentum as more innovations and innovators gravitate toward the 
technology with the largest stock of knowledge.13 Building upon a few 
decades of work on the dynamics of innovation,14 new research shows 
 
 
11.  Daron Acemoglu et al., The Environment and Directed Technical Change, 102 AM. ECON. 
REV. 131, 132–33 (2012) [hereinafter Acemoglu et al., Environment and Technical Change]; 
Acemoglu et al., Transition, supra note 2, at 54–56. 
12.  This Article can be viewed as a specific application of David Driesen’s general critique that 
economic analysis of environmental law, as well as law more generally, ignores dynamics. See 
generally DAVID M. DRIESEN, THE ECONOMIC DYNAMICS OF LAW (2012); DAVID M. DRIESEN, THE 
ECONOMIC DYNAMICS OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (2003). 
13.  This point on path dependence in innovation has parallel observations that some in 
environmental law and policy have made about technological path dependence resulting from the lock-
in of dirtytech capital. RICHARD L. REVESZ & JACK LIENKE, STRUGGLING FOR AIR: POWER PLANTS AND 
THE “WAR ON COAL” 24–29 (2016) (describing how exemptions of existing power plants from many 
Clean Air Act emission standards delayed the retirement of dirtytech capital); Emily Hammond & Jim 
Rossi, Stranded Costs and Grid Decarbonization, BROOK. L. REV. (forthcoming), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2833870 (observing that investments in natural gas threaten to lock society 
into fossil fuels in the mid-term due to the longevity of natural gas infrastructure); Patrick Parenteau & 
Abigail Barnes, A Bridge Too Far: Building Off-Ramps on the Shale Gas Superhighway, 49 IDAHO L. 
REV. 325, 328 (2013) (expressing similar concerns about the path-dependent nature of investing in 
natural gas production). But the mechanisms for innovation are different than those for capital lock-in, 
and the implications of the cleantech innovation stock are global in scope and therefore potentially 
much more significant. 
14.  For key economics articles see, Paul M. Romer, Endogenous Technological Change, 98 J. 
POL. ECON. S71, S71 (1990) (linking endogenous growth rates to changes in the stock of human 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol95/iss2/7
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how innovation exhibits this path dependence—namely, how a 
blockbuster innovation in solar can change the course of innovation 
because innovation builds on itself.15 Innovators “stand on the shoulders of 
giants”—and, under circumstances that this Article explains, they prefer to 
stand on the tallest shoulders in order to get the quickest, largest financial 
returns.16 
This new research has transformational implications for the law, which 
this Article works out. Most basically, innovation policy should be at the 
core of environmental policy—and likely other areas of policy as well. In 
particular, environmental policy should include innovation policy that 
specifically encourages cleantech, since cleantech innovation needs a big 
push so that its innovation will snowball beyond that of dirtytech. Due to 
society’s failure to tax greenhouse gas emission for over a century, the 
accumulation of dirtytech knowledge has far outpaced that of cleantech.17 
As a result, innovators are in a rut: they gravitate toward dirty technology 
because it has the largest knowledge stock, having benefitted from 
dirtytech subsidies as well as the longstanding absence of a carbon tax, 
and therefore promises the quickest profits. But a big push of government 
support for innovation in clean energy will catapult innovators out of their 
dirty energy rut and onto a cleantech path that the planet needs to avoid 
massive climate disruption. 
How policymakers should implement this big push is the topic of the 
second half of the Article. We explain the implications for three areas of 
climate policy: domestic innovation policy, domestic non-innovation 
policy, and international policy. 
First, innovation snowballing has several implications for domestic 
innovation policy in areas touching on climate policy. One key implication 
is that innovation snowballing reduces the appeal of using intellectual 
property (IP) to promote cleantech relative to subsidies like prizes, 
 
 
capital), and Philippe Aghion & Peter Howitt, A Model of Growth Through Creative Destruction, 60 
ECONOMETRICA 323 (1992) (developing of a model of endogenous growth generated by a competitive 
research sector). See also Suzanne Scotchmer, Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: Cumulative 
Research and the Patent Law, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 29 (1991) (applying this line of research to patent 
law). 
15.  See Daron Acemoglu, Directed Technical Change, 69 REV. ECON. STUD. 781, 781 (2002) 
(outlining a theoretical framework for innovation path dependency). For empirical estimates of 
innovation snowballing, see, for example, Philippe Aghion et al., Carbon Taxes, Path Dependency, 
and Directed Technical Change: Evidence from the Auto Industry, 124 J. POL. ECON. 1, 1 (2016); W. 
Walker Hanlon, Necessity is the Mother of Invention: Input Supplies and Directed Technical Change, 
83 ECONOMETRICA 67, 67 (2015). 
16.  Acemoglu, supra note 15, at 793. 
17.  See Acemoglu et al., Transition, supra note 2, at 79–80 (finding empirical evidence of a 
large gap between cleantech and dirtytech knowledge stocks). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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research grants, and research and development (R&D) tax credits. Patents 
and other forms of intellectual property have a main purported advantage 
of using markets to provide guidance on the value of innovations and main 
disadvantages of transaction costs and monopoly pricing, making it more 
difficult to use others’ innovations.18 Innovation snowballing undercuts the 
benefits of patents by reducing the utility of market valuation, since 
markets reflect an uneven playing field created by a century of untaxed 
greenhouse gas externalities. Additionally, because patents hinder the use 
of others’ innovations, they slow the snowballing process. As a result, 
innovation snowballing makes patents a less compelling tool for spurring 
cleantech innovation. We suggest a cleantech R&D tax credit as a possibly 
useful tool in this context. 
Innovation snowballing also undercuts some long-held views about the 
structure of domestic innovation subsidies. For example, conventional 
wisdom calls for subsidizing research on basic science over R&D on 
products closer to commercialization because research on basic science is 
least likely to be provided by the private sector.19 However, a compelling 
reason to subsidize late-stage R&D is that its contribution to path 
dependence can be more easily discerned, unsettling the conventional 
preference for basic science. Path dependence also emphasizes the value 
of prioritizing increases in R&D spending over reductions in emissions in 
the short term, as the sooner society closes the innovation gap between 
cleantech and dirtytech, the sooner private-sector innovation will flow to 
cleantech without government support. In other words, in the short term, 
innovation snowballing argues for prioritizing technological development 
alongside (and to some extent instead of) emissions reductions to achieve 
a long-term goal of greater emissions reductions. 
Innovation snowballing also offers guidance on what types of 
innovations should be prioritized: in particular, those that build up the 
cleantech innovation stock. Innovation snowballing makes two types of 
innovations less appealing than they would otherwise seem: first, 
innovations that make dirtytech cleaner, like improvements in the 
 
 
18.  Steven Shavell & Tanguy van Ypersele, Rewards Versus Intellectual Property Rights, 44 
J.L. & ECON. 525, 525–27 (2001) (describing the debate between patents and rewards); Benjamin N. 
Roin, Intellectual Property Versus Prizes: Reframing the Debate, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 999, 999 (2014); 
Amy Kapczynski, The Cost of Price: Why and How to Get Beyond Intellectual Property Internalism, 
59 UCLA L. REV. 970, 974–75 (2012) (discussing both the dominant view of intellectual property and 
the “long and important tradition of dissent”). 
19.  David Popp, Induced Innovation and Energy Prices, 92 AM. ECON. REV. 160, 177 (2002); 
Richard R. Nelson, The Simple Economics of Basic Scientific Research, 67 J. POL. ECON. 297, 302 
(1959); Hall, Mairesse & Mohnen, supra note 3, at 1051 (summarizing several empirical studies 
showing that the social returns to research are higher for basic than for applied or development 
research).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol95/iss2/7
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efficiency of the internal combustion engine or carbon capture and 
sequestration; and second, innovations that produce low-emissions 
cleantech but help build up the stock of dirtytech innovations, such as 
biomass energy, which builds on and contributes to combustion 
technologies. Both types involve innovations that may further entrench 
dirty fossil fuel energy sources.20 Innovation snowballing offers a reason 
to focus on technologies, like wind and solar, that especially build up 
cleantech and not dirtytech—though, of course, the Article cannot solve 
the difficult technical questions about what role various technologies 
should play in the future energy mix. 
Second, innovation snowballing draws into question long-held views 
about the value of domestic non-innovation policies—or policies that are 
not necessarily designed specifically to spur innovation, but may 
nonetheless produce innovation effects. For example, some performance 
standards, such as those for fuel economy, induce technological 
development, but in ways that may make dirtytech cleaner rather than 
cleantech cheaper.21 By contributing to the dirtytech knowledge stock, 
these regulations run the risk of being counter-productive, as they can 
perversely entrench dirtytech. Innovation snowballing likewise unsettles 
conventional views about deployment subsidies, such as those for 
installing solar panels or buying electric vehicles, which are generally 
regarded as bad policies by economists.22 This Article does not take a 
stand on whether such subsidies should be adopted; however, the existence 
of innovation snowballing makes them more valuable than generally 
recognized because they induce innovation and can thus have longstanding 
impacts in shifting the innovation equilibrium.23 Conversely, subsidies for 
fossil fuels are even worse than generally recognized because they widen 
the innovation gap between cleantech and dirtytech. Similarly, 
infrastructure spending is even more consequential than is generally 
 
 
20.  See infra Section III.B.1. 
21.  For a review of the technology forcing nature of these fuel economy standards, see Ian Ayres 
& Amy Kapczynski, Innovation Sticks: The Limited Case for Penalizing Failures to Innovate, 82 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1781, 1815–17 (2015). In 2010, EPA and the National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration (NHSTA) finalized a joint rule setting fuel economy and greenhouse gas emission 
standards for model year 2012 through 2016. See Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission 
Standards and Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards, 75 Fed. Reg. 25,324, 25,324 (May 7, 
2010). 
22.  Robert W. Hahn, Climate Policy: Separating Fact from Fantasy, 33 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 
557, 580 (2009) (arguing that subsidies are not well-suited for incentivizing cleantech innovation); 
Lawrence H. Goulder & Ian W. H. Parry, Instrument Choice in Environmental Policy, REV. ENVTL. 
ECON. & POL’Y 152, 155–157 (2008) (observing that subsidies can induce excessive output). 
23.  Popp, supra note 19, at 160 (providing empirical evidence of induced innovation in the 
context of energy technologies). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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regarded. For example, while we do not take a stand on whether building 
Keystone XL and fracking infrastructure are good ideas,24 they are likely 
worse than conventional law and economics analysis suggests, since they 
will not only lock in dirtytech infrastructure but also induce more dirtytech 
innovation. 
Third, the Article draws out a parallel set of implications in the 
international arena. The current international climate regime fails to 
sufficiently encourage the switch to cleantech. It encourages reductions, 
but—beyond what is provided by patents—does not give countries 
“credit” for reductions in ways that will redirect technological 
development toward cleantech to benefit the whole world.25 It leaves 
proverbial low-hanging fruit on the table, failing to seize one of the 
cheapest means to achieve climate stabilization: innovations that help 
make the shoulders of cleantech giants taller (i.e., more profitable) than 
those of their dirtytech competitors. We suggest that the next round of 
international negotiations could disproportionately incentivize reductions 
through innovation rather than through production cutbacks or the 
adoption of existing technology, since innovation doubly benefits the 
world—through innovation snowballing and reduced pollution. 
While this Article primarily argues for increased use of innovation 
tools to combat climate change as a matter of economics, political 
economy considerations reinforce this recommendation. First, innovation 
commits future and foreign governments to emissions reductions in a way 
that carbon taxes or agreements to reduce emissions in the short-term do 
not. Cleantech innovation cannot be repealed while a carbon tax can. Also, 
cleantech innovation policy helps build a political constituency for a 
carbon tax and reduces the cost of adopting one, suggesting—with some 
historical support—that innovation policy can help lead to the adoption of 
a carbon tax.26 
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I explains the reasoning behind 
the conventional view that a carbon tax would induce an efficient amount 
of innovation. Part II introduces innovation snowballing, explaining how it 
upends the conventional view. Parts III and IV examine how innovation 
 
 
24.  See generally Parenteau & Barnes, supra note 13, at 326–29 (outlining the pros and cons of 
natural gas infrastructure). 
25.  U.N. Conference of the Parties, Adoption of the Paris Agreement, U.N. Doc. 
FCCC/CP/2015/L.9/Rev.1 (Art. 10) (Dec. 12, 2015); Annalisa Savaresi, The Paris Agreement: A New 
Beginning?, 34 J. ENERGY & NAT. RESOURCES L. 16, 16 (2016) (providing an overview of the 
Agreement).  
26.  See Jonas Meckling et al., Winning Coalitions for Climate Policy, 349 SCI. 1170, 1170 
(2015) (finding that nearly two-thirds of climate pricing regimes were preceded by either a renewable 
portfolio standard or a feed-in tariff for cleantech). 
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snowballing affect the merits of policy options at the domestic and 
international level. Part V discusses political economy considerations. 
I. INNOVATION AND SOCIAL HARMS: THE CONVENTIONAL EFFICIENCY 
STORY 
In conventional economics, the story of innovation and social harms 
like climate change is rarely laid out in a clear manner, but is implicit 
nonetheless in much of the existing legal and economic scholarship. It is a 
story of two externalities—one from the production of innovation, the 
other from the production of a social harm like pollution.27 Within the 
conventional framework, each externality operates on a separate, parallel 
track: there is no interaction between the two issues and each externality is 
solved independently. 
The first externality results from “innovation spillovers.” Without any 
government intervention to promote innovation, society will produce an 
inefficiently small amount of innovation, as a result of innovators’ 
inability to capture the full value of their investments in research and 
development, which results in innovation spillovers benefitting other 
innovators.28 While creating new ideas can be quite costly, appropriating 
new ideas that others have produced can be relatively cheap. So, in the 
absence of intellectual property, there are strong incentives to free ride: 
non-innovators may just use innovators’ ideas without compensating the 
original innovator. As a result, many innovators will not put forth the 
effort to create new inventions, even when they create great social value.29 
Intellectual property solves part of this problem, but not all of it.30 
 
 
27.  Jaffe, Newell & Stavins, supra note 9, at 164 (describing the conventional economic analysis 
of cleantech innovation). 
28.  For the classic article on the welfare implications of innovation spillovers, see Kenneth J. 
Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention, in THE RATE AND DIRECTION 
OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FACTORS 609 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research ed., 
1962). 
29.  Adam B. Jaffe, Richard G. Newell & Robert N. Stavins, Technological Changes and the 
Environment, in HANDBOOK OF ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS 461, 471 (K.G. Mäler & J.R. Vincent 
eds., 2003) (noting that knowledge spillovers to freeriding firms and consumers can lead to 
“significant underinvestment by private firms in R&D, relative to the social optimum”). 
30.  Empirical evidence on whether strong patent protection boosts innovation is mixed. For a 
brief review of this work, see Keishun Suzuki, Economic Growth Under Two Forms of Intellectual 
Property Rights Protection: Patents and Trade Secrets, 115 J. ECON. 49, 50–51 (2015). In addition, it 
is also worth noting that nearly all IP rights are time limited, meaning that non-innovating firms can 
benefit from a new invention twenty years down the line. Kenneth Gillingham & James Sweeney, 
Market Failure and the Structure of Externalities, in HARNESSING RENEWABLE ENERGY IN ELECTRIC 
POWER SYSTEMS: THEORY, PRACTICE, POLICY 69, 78 (Boaz Moselle, Jorge Padilla & Richard 
Schmalensee eds., 2010). 
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Intellectual property creates incentives for innovators to produce new 
ideas by forcing users of those ideas to pay the creators.31 However, not all 
new knowledge is patentable.32 As a result, economists estimate that there 
are large spillovers of value from innovation activity—with the innovators 
themselves only capturing at most half of the benefits of their innovation.33 
These innovation spillovers take a variety of forms. At the R&D stage of 
innovation, for example, knowledge can “leak” to competitors as scientists 
switch firms.34 Reverse engineering, technical conferences, and 
publications in academic journals have also been identified as conduits for 
innovation spillovers.35 And as a new technology moves toward 
commercialization, non-innovators may benefit from a variety of learning-
by-doing effects—that is, efficiency improvements that arise when a firm 
accrues experience in producing a technology.36 To the extent that non-
innovators can appropriate this experiential knowledge, innovation leaders 
will see their returns to innovation siphoned off by their competitors (free 
of charge).37 The result of these spillovers is that, even with intellectual 
 
 
31.  See e.g., Joseph E. Stiglitz, Economic Foundations of Intellectual Property Rights, 57 DUKE 
L.J. 1693, 1699–1700 (2008); Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 6, at 327–28. 
32.  For example, tacit knowledge is difficult to patent because, by definition, it is difficult to 
capture in writing. See David B. Audretsch & Maryann P. Feldman, Knowledge Spillovers and the 
Geography of Innovation, in 4 HANDBOOK OF REGIONAL AND URBAN ECONOMICS 2713, 2718–19 
(J.V. Henderson & J.F. Thisse, eds., 2004). 
33.  Careful surveys of the empirical literature find that the social rates of return to research and 
development (which tend to cluster between thirty percent and seventy percent) are two to five times 
greater than corresponding private rates (which often range between six percent and fifteen percent). 
See Gillingham & Sweeney, supra note 30, at 78; Hall, Mairesse & Mohnen, supra note 3, at 1050–51. 
If social rates of return are at least twice the corresponding private rate, then private innovators capture 
at most half of the benefits from innovation. See also Charles I. Jones & John C. Williams, Measuring 
the Social Rate of Return to R&D, 113 Q. J. ECON. 1119, 1119–21 (1998) (using a macroeconomic 
growth model to conclude that the true social rates of return from R&D are at least two to four times 
greater than private returns). 
34.  See Amar Bhide, How Entrepreneurs Craft Strategies that Work, 72 HARV. BUS. REV. 150, 
151 (1994) (finding that seventy-one percent of founders of fast-growing start-up companies reported 
replicating or modifying “an idea encountered through previous employment”). Econometric analyses 
similarly identify interfirm mobility as an important conduit for knowledge diffusion. See, e.g., Mika 
Maliranta et al., Is Inter-Firm Labor Mobility a Channel of Knowledge Spillovers? Evidence from a 
Linked Employer-Employee Panel, 18 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 1161, 1161–62 (2009); Paul Almeida 
& Bruce Kogut, Localization of Knowledge and the Mobility of Engineers in Regional Networks, 45 
MGMT. SCI. 905, 905–07 (1999). 
35.  See Nordhaus, supra note 1, at 666 (discussing the role of conferences and journals in 
diffusing new ideas); Hall, Mairesse & Mohnen, supra note 3 (same). 
36.  Economists have shown that learning processes play a key role in reducing the production 
costs of new technologies. See, e.g., Richard McDowell, Learning by Doing and Spillovers in 
Renewable Energy: Evidence from U.S. Wind and Solar Farms 2 (Mass. Inst. of Tech., Working 
Paper, 2015) (noting that learning-by-doing has yielded productivity gains in “numerous industries, 
including shipbuilding, vehicle and airplane manufacturing, and the production of semi-conductors”). 
37.  While there are strong theoretical reasons for thinking that learning-by-doing externalities 
exist, economists have struggled to develop precise estimates of them. See Gillingham & Sweeney, 
supra note 30 (discussing the econometric difficulties in empirically identifying learning-by-doing 
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property protections, innovators will not produce the socially efficient 
amount of innovation. For innovations that would benefit society but are 
relatively costly to produce, many innovators will not be compensated 
enough by the private returns to their intellectual property alone to justify 
the investment. 
To address those spillovers, additional subsidies are needed to 
encourage innovators to produce new ideas up to the efficient amount. For 
example, if a new idea produces benefits of $100 to society, but the 
innovator only captures $50 of value (through patents, for example), then 
basic economic theory calls for a government subsidy of $50. These 
subsidies could take various forms, including research and development 
tax credits,38 prizes, grants, and direct government funding of research.39 
With the subsidies and the private returns, innovators will have the proper 
incentives to develop socially beneficial innovations. 
Innovation externalities may occur with or without a second 
externality: a social harm, like pollution, that results from consuming and 
producing a product. Since the classic negative externality is pollution, we 
will call this the “pollution externality.” In the context of climate change, a 
factory produces greenhouse gas emissions, increasing the risk of climate 
change, but does not pay for the social harm caused to others. There are 
also many externalities in public health, for examle: if someone spreads a 
disease to others, he has imposed a negative externality on them. Even 
income inequality can be viewed as an externality: if an employer pays her 
impoverished workers more, and society generally wishes to reduce 
poverty or income inequality, then the employer has imposed a positive 
externality on the general population, making them better-off without 
receiving any compensation from them. 
In areas with pollution externalities, there is a standard response that 
parallels the response to innovation externalities: a tax corresponding to 
the size of the externality. So, for example, if a polluter causes a harm of 
$50, then it should pay a fee of $50. That way, the polluter will have the 
proper incentive to reduce pollution, since—with the fee—the polluter will 
pay the full social cost of polluting. 40 
The central question of this Article is: if innovation in general is 
 
 
externalities). 
38.  I.R.C. § 174 (2015) (expensing of research and experimental expenditures); I.R.C. § 41 
(2015) (credit for increasing research activities).  
39.  See SUZANNE SCOTCHMER, INNOVATION AND INCENTIVES 32 (2006). 
40.  See, for example, CHARLES D. KOLSTAD, ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS (2009), for a 
discussion of this so-called “Pigouvian taxation.” 
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properly incentivized through intellectual property and technology-neutral 
subsidies, and if those causing social harms are fined by the amount of 
harm that they are causing, is there any reason to additionally encourage 
innovation to address the social harm? That is, should innovation policy 
treat innovations that mitigate social harms (e.g., cleantech or a vaccine) 
differently from those that do not (e.g., dirtytech or a new computer 
gaming app for smartphones)? So, taking the example of pollution, if the 
government already (1) provides $1 in innovation subsidies for every $1 of 
positive innovation spillovers, and (2) taxes polluters $1 for every $1 of 
social harm from their greenhouse gas emissions, is there any additional 
reason to subsidize innovation in cleantech? 
It may seem intuitive that subsidies to innovate should be higher where 
the innovations will help mitigate a social harm. Increasing subsidies for 
cleantech innovation might seem appealing because it results in two 
benefits: promoting innovation spillovers as well as reducing pollution.41 
But conventional efficiency analysis rejects this line of thinking. (The 
Online Appendix42 shows these results mathematically.) Under the 
conventional approach, to address pollution or other social harms, it is 
most efficient to encourage those causing the harm to take the most cost-
effective means of reducing it. A polluter may have many means of 
reducing pollution in response to a newly imposed pollution fee. It could 
shut down, reduce production, or switch to an existing, lower-pollution 
technology. Or it could innovate new cleantech: and, indeed, innovation 
(called “induced innovation”) does result from taxing social harms like 
pollution.43 Assuming that the government provides technology-neutral 
innovation subsidies that account for innovation externalities in general, 
the polluter is already properly incentivized to produce efficient levels of 
cleantech. Any increases in the subsidy for cleantech innovation would 
result in too much innovation, because it would induce some polluters to 
produce expensive cleantech innovations when they could have achieved 
the same emissions reductions at a lower cost through other means. Thus, 
the conventional view is that, to solve the social problem of climate 
change, the necessary and sufficient condition is to tax the activity causing 
the social harm, so long as innovation overall is properly incentivized 
 
 
41.  Margalioth, supra note 1, at 88 (justifying “subsidies or government grants for research in 
the area of alternative clean energy sources” on the existence of standard innovation spillovers); 
Joshua D. Sarnoff, Government Choices in Innovation Funding (With Reference to Climate Change), 
62 EMORY L.J. 1087–94 (2013) (motivating an analysis of cleantech innovation funding with a 
discussion of standard innovation spillovers). 
42.  The Online Appendix to this Article is available at https://sites.google.com/site/liscow/. 
43.  David Popp, Innovation and Climate Policy, 2 ANN. REV. RESOURCE ECON. 275, 280–83 
(2010) (summarizing the empirical literature on environmental policy and induced innovation). 
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through a technology-neutral innovation subsidy. 
The conventional efficiency story identifies a parallel risk where the 
government seeks to spur cleantech innovation by increasing its pollution 
tax beyond the level equal to the social harm caused by the pollution. 
Again, it may seem that this policy would result in two benefits: less 
pollution and more innovation spillovers because of the induced 
innovation. But this policy will cause some polluters to inefficiently adopt 
expensive existing technologies or cut back on production when 
innovating new cleantech is actually the cheapest way to reduce emissions, 
yielding inefficiently expensive increases in innovation.44 
Thus, according to conventional analysis, the most efficient way to 
reduce pollution is to tax pollution in accordance with the uncaptured 
harm it causes. And the most efficient way to encourage innovation is to 
subsidize innovation in accordance with the uncaptured spillover benefits 
it produces. The two policies operate on parallel, non-interacting paths. 
And no further government intervention would be efficient. 
In practice, the subsidy for innovation spillovers or the tax on the social 
harm may be suboptimal (the Online Appendix develops results under 
these circumstances). In that case, the conventional analysis does not hold, 
and a variety of “second-best” policies (i.e., policies that are good to adopt 
when the “first-best”—i.e., optimally efficient—option is not available) 
would be desirable.45 For example, if there is an insufficiently high 
pollution fee, then increasing cleantech innovation subsidies will help pick 
up the slack by encouraging innovation that would have been induced by 
the ideal pollution fee. Similarly, if there are insufficiently high innovation 
subsidies in general, then increasing the pollution fee also helps pick up 
the slack by inducing some innovation that would have been incentivized 
by the ideal innovation subsidy. But these are just second-best policies. 
This Article focuses on first-best policies, asking: in the best of all worlds, 
what policies should be adopted to maximize efficiency? For that, the 
conventional efficiency argument remains: reduce pollution by taxing 
pollution and encourage innovation by subsidizing innovation. 
Many reasons beyond efficiency may justify addressing social harms 
by encouraging innovation. For example, implementation difficulties 
could drive increased subsidization. Consider the case of vaccines. Fining 
people for spreading disease would cause people to demand vaccines, 
inducing innovation. But imposing such a fine would be very difficult. So, 
 
 
44.  See Online Appendix, supra note 42. 
45.  R. G. Lipsey & Kelvin Lancaster, The General Theory of Second Best, 24 REV. ECON. STUD. 
11, 11 (1956) (introducing the theory of second-best). 
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directly subsidizing innovation in vaccines may very well be the best 
feasible policy. Alternatively, one might believe that people have a right to 
a vaccine, justifying government spending on vaccines for reasons beyond 
economic efficiency. 
But this Article focuses on an economic efficiency justification for 
targeting innovation to solve social problems.46 And currently the views of 
efficiency-oriented scholars on how to address climate change—the focus 
of this paper—reflect the views implied by conventional economic 
thinking. For example, environmental law casebooks barely mention 
innovation policy.47 The policy discussion addressing climate change 
overwhelmingly focuses on a carbon tax or a cap-and-trade scheme, rather 
than on subsidizing innovation in cleantech.48 Implicit or explicit in these 
analyses is the belief that pollution pricing alone will induce optimal 
amounts of cleantech innovation, assuming a backdrop of optimal general 
innovation policy.49 In other words, innovation problems are seen as 
 
 
     46.    Of course, there are important differences between well-being and efficiency, especially in 
contexts involving individuals of different income levels. See Zachary Liscow, Is Efficiency Biased?, 
Yale Law and Economics Research Paper No. 581 (2017), available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=3018 
796 (explaining the differences between efficiency and well-being). 
47.  We checked eight of the most prominent environmental law casebooks by searching for the 
term “innovation” in the table of contents and for the terms “innovation,” “invention,” and 
“technology” in the index. Although all mention technology-forcing regulations (though generally in a 
cursory way), none has a substantial discussion of innovation policy. For example, only HUNTER ET 
AL. infra, even mentions intellectual property directly. See ZYGMUNT PLATER ET AL., 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY: NATURE, LAW, AND SOCIETY 178–79, 507–12 (5th ed. 2016); 
DAVID HUNTER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY 80–83, 1296–99 (5th ed. 
2015); RICHARD REVESZ, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 176, 547 (3rd ed. 2015); ROBERT 
PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE AND POLICY 161–64, 555 (7th ed. 
2013); HOLLY DOREMUS ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY LAW 35, 698, 705–09 (6th ed. 2012); 
ROBERT GLICKSMAN ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: LAW AND POLICY (6th ed. 2011); LINDA 
MALONE & WILLIAM TABB, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, POLICY, AND PRACTICE 362, 373, 378, 381, 482, 
829 (2nd ed. 2011); J. B. RUHL ET AL., THE PRACTICE AND POLICY OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 195–98, 
211, 229 (2nd ed. 2010). 
48.  See, e.g., Kestenbaum, supra note 10 (quoting economist Henry Jacoby of MIT as claiming 
that climate change can be solved by taxing carbon emissions); Paulson Jr., supra note 10 (arguing that 
the solution to climate change is putting a price on carbon dioxide emissions); Krugman, supra note 10 
(framing climate change as “a classic negative externality”). See also Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, 
On the Superiority of Corrective Taxes to Quantity Regulation, 4 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 1, 1 (2002). 
49.  Alex Rice Kerr, Why We Need a Carbon Tax, 34 ENVIRONS ENVTL. L. & POL’Y J. 69, 75 
(2010) (explaining why a carbon tax is better than other policy instruments at bringing about “a clean 
tech revolution”); Pierce, supra note 10, at 307 (recognizing that “[o]ur only hope of mitigating global 
warming lies in major technological breakthroughs,” but focusing solely on a carbon tax as the 
mechanism for bringing about these needed technology advancements); Jonathan M. Gilligan & 
Michael P. Vandenbergh, Accounting for Political Feasibility in Climate Instrument Choice, 32 VA. 
ENVTL. L.J. 1, 23 (2014) (observing that “[c]ap and trade programs and carbon taxes emerge as the 
optimal remedy in the economics and legal literatures” for addressing climate change); Roberta Mann, 
How to Love the One You’re With: Changing Tax Policy To Fit Cap-and-Trade, 2 SAN DIEGO J. 
CLIMATE & ENERGY L. 145, 156, 161–62 (2010) (characterizing a carbon tax as the optimal policy 
response and concluding that pricing carbon is more efficient than subsidizing particular sources of 
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derivative of the unaddressed pollution problem. As a result, addressing 
the negative externalities associated with greenhouse gas emissions is 
assumed to also address the cleantech innovation problem. 
Of course, we are not the first to suggest that policy should specifically 
encourage cleantech innovation.50 Many of the early modern 
environmental regulations were “technology-forcing,” designed 
specifically to encourage innovation.51 For example, in the Clean Air Act 
and the Clean Water Act, Congress mandated that regulated entities adopt 
the “Best Available Technology” (BAT) for pollution control.52 Because 
such technologies do not need to be commercially available (or even in 
existence) at the time of promulgation,53 they were expected to push the 
boundaries of technological progress by requiring industry to invent and 
install increasingly effective pollution-control equipment.54 More recently, 
some policy groups have proposed a “moonshot”55 in clean energy.56 But a 
 
 
energy, without acknowledging separate innovation justifications for innovation subsidies). 
50.  Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law: The Democratic 
Case for Market Incentives, 13 COLUMBIA J. OF ENVTL. L. 171, 174 (1988). Others have made similar 
critiques on the basis of integrated assessment models failing to allow for endogenous technological 
change, instead of assuming a constant rate that does not allow for transformative technological 
change. See Douglas A. Kysar, Commentary, Politics by Other Meanings: A Comment on “Retaking 
Rationality Two Years Later,” 48 HOUS. L. REV. 43, 57–66 (2011) (noting, among other things, that 
the social cost of carbon used in climate assessment models is built around marginal changes that 
assume away transformative technological change). However, we are the first to walk through the new 
economics framework of path dependent innovation and apply them to the spectrum of environmental 
policy options. 
51.  See D. Bruce La Pierre, Technology-Forcing and Federal Environmental Protection 
Statutes, 62 IOWA L. REV. 771, 771 (1977) (documenting how the environmental statutes of the 1970s 
sought to protect public health, spur technological advancements in pollution control technologies, and 
induce industry to accept the costs of pollution control equipment). 
52.  See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(1)(C) (2012) (Clean Air Act); 33 U.S.C. § 1316(a)(1) (Clean 
Water Act). 
53.  See Portland Cement Ass’n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 391 (D.C. Cir. 1973). See also 
Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 364 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (holding that pollution standards 
promulgated under section 111 of the Clean Air Act can still be lawful even if industry cannot meet 
them using existing technology). 
54.  See Sunstein, supra note 9, at 420 (observing that the “BAT strategy is motivated by a desire 
to produce technological innovation”). For defenses of technology-based regulation, see Sidney A. 
Shapiro & Thomas O. McGarity, Not So Paradoxical: The Rationale for Technology-Based 
Regulation, 1991 DUKE L.J. 729, 751 (1991) (arguing for technology standards primarily on the basis 
of a non-efficiency based normative goal—in particular, “that society should do the best it can to 
protect workers, even when” traditional efficiency analysis would reject the measure), and Howard 
Latin, Ideal Versus Real Regulatory Efficiency: Implementation of Uniform Standards and “Fine-
Tuning” Regulatory Reforms, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1267, 1270–73 (1985) (arguing that the efficiency 
benefits of market-oriented reforms may be more theoretical than realized). 
55.  A “moonshot” refers to a big, government-supported push in innovation like sending a 
human to the moon. 
56.  See Alisha Fowler, Gore Issues ‘Moon Shot’ Call, BREAKTHROUGH INST. (July 17, 2008), 
https://thebreakthrough.org/archive/gore_issues_moon_shot_call; Andrew C. Revkin, Opinion, Bill 
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cleantech moonshot has lacked an efficiency argument for its adoption—
until now. 
II. INNOVATION SNOWBALLING 
A. In Cleantech 
The problem with the conventional story is that, in the presence of a 
carbon tax or other tax on a social harm, it treats all current innovations as 
if they will have the same impact on future innovations. As this Part 
explains, that is probably a poor prediction. In the conventional story, 
innovation spillovers benefit the rest of society by helping them innovate. 
But there is no account of what future innovators will produce in response 
to earlier innovations. This Part explains “innovation snowballing,” the 
process by which earlier innovations can lead to similar but more 
advanced innovations, causing a snowballing of innovation in a particular 
technology area, like cleantech. 
With the innovation spillovers that innovation policy scholars are used 
to considering, innovators benefit one another because each individual 
innovator is unable to reap the full rewards from her innovations. This 
feature captures an important part of the innovation process, but not the 
whole story. Another feature of innovation is path dependence, in which 
the innovation choices of past innovators influence the types of innovation 
pursued by future innovators. Path dependence does not necessarily 
directly benefit innovators. Rather, it redirects innovators toward the types 
of technologies with the larger stock of knowledge by changing the 
relative profitability of different types of technologies. Redirecting 
technological development toward cleantech may not increase the 
profitability of innovating or producing in the energy sector (and thus may 
not lead to innovation spillovers), but it does reduce pollution 
externalities. Thus, with innovation snowballing the population at large— 
not the innovators themselves—gain from technological development with 
social benefits like lower pollution externalities. And unlike spillovers, 
 
 
Gates’s Clean-Energy Moon Shot, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 23, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/23/ 
opinion/bill-gatess-clean-energy-moon-shot.html. And, of course, many academics recognize the 
importance of innovation to solving climate change. See, e.g., Daniel C. Esty, Rethinking Global 
Environmental Governance to Deal with Climate Change: The Multiple Logics of Global Collective 
Action, 98 AM. ECON. REV. 116, 119 (2008); NICHOLAS STERN, STERN REVIEW: THE ECONOMICS OF 
CLIMATE CHANGE (2007); Adelman & Engel, supra note 8, at 835 (arguing that state policymakers 
should focus primarily on innovation-related market failures while the federal government should be 
primarily responsible for addressing the negative externalities of greenhouse gas emissions); Felix 
Mormann, Requirements for a Renewables Revolution, 38 ECOLOGY L.Q. 903, 903 (2011) (explaining 
why carbon pricing will not induce optimal cleantech innovation levels). 
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innovation snowballing does justify encouraging cleantech innovation 
even in the presence of an optimal carbon tax and optimal general 
innovation policy. In particular, new economic research suggests that there 
are substantial social welfare gains to encouraging clean technology 
innovation specifically, along with a carbon tax.57 Innovation snowballing 
resuscitates early environmental law’s goals (though not its means) of 
using policy to encourage the development of certain pollution-reducing 
technologies. 
Today’s innovators “stand on the shoulders” of yesterday’s 
innovators.58 Pick almost any technology, and it will be the combination of 
a myriad of innovations developed across many years. There would be no 
Uber, for example, without the invention of GPS. There would be no 
electric car without the invention of the battery. Innovation is a cumulative 
process whereby past innovations create new opportunities for future 
innovations. All else equal, innovating in technologies with small 
knowledge stocks (e.g., cleantech) will tend to be less productive and less 
profitable than innovating in technologies with large knowledge stocks 
(e.g., dirtytech). As a result, profit-seeking innovators naturally gravitate 
towards technologies with the most productive knowledge base—and 
therefore the greatest expected returns to research and development 
investments.59 Innovation therefore begets more innovation, creating path 
dependencies and inertia in the direction of technological change. A 
corollary to this insight is that society will sometimes continue to innovate 
in certain technologies, even after it becomes clear that superior 
alternatives exist. Economists have been working with the “standing-on-
shoulders” idea for a few decades now.60 What’s new is working out the 
implications of the path dependence where the dominant existing 
technology produces big negative externalities, like greenhouse gas 
emissions. The result of innovation snowballing is that the innovation 
system has multiple possible technology equilibria—and that major 
interventions can shift the system to a different equilibrium by altering the 
relative productivity of different lines of research.61 
 
 
57.  Acemoglu et al., Environment and Technical Change, supra note 11, at 313. 
58.  Acemoglu, supra note 15, at 793; Romer, supra note 14; Aghion & Howitt, supra note 14; 
JOHN R. HICKS, THE THEORY OF WAGES 124–25 (1932) (discussing how changes in the relative prices 
of production factors directs innovation flows).  
59.  Acemoglu et al., Transition, supra note 2, at 53; Popp, supra note 43, at 280–81; Jaffe, 
Newell & Stavins, supra note 29, at 469–71. 
60.  Romer, supra note 14; Aghion & Howitt, supra note 14; Scotchmer, supra note 14. 
61.  See, e.g., John J. Donohue III & James Heckman, Continuous Versus Episodic Change: The 
Impact of Civil Rights Policy on the Economic Status of Blacks, 29 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1603, 1639 
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The concept can perhaps be best understood through the example of 
VHS and Betamax, two competing video format technologies in the 1970s 
and 1980s.62 For what many think were largely idiosyncratic reasons, VHS 
won out over Betamax, despite there being little inherent advantage of one 
over the other.63 As a result, VHS technology kept on advancing, while 
Betamax did not. But imagine that society later discovered that VHS, but 
not Betamax, produced a big negative externality. This is essentially the 
story of energy technology: fossil fuels have benefited from decades of 
innovation, which largely explains why they are cheaper than clean 
energy.64 Unless the VHS externality posed an immediate threat, the best 
way to switch from VHS to Betamax would not be to suddenly apply a 
large tax on VHS—that would inefficiently lead to a surge in consumer 
prices for VHS. Rather, as we show below, the solution would be to 
subsidize innovation (in concert with a modest tax) so that the stock of 
Betamax innovation could catch up with the stock of VHS innovation—
resulting in companies eventually choosing to invest in the Betamax 
technology by virtue of both the price signal and the stock of innovation 
that enables it to be made cheaply and with high quality. 
Figure 1 depicts in a simplistic fashion the decision-making tendencies 
of private innovators in a world of path dependence, contrasting the 
outcomes with and without government intervention in cleantech 
innovation. To distill innovation snowballing to its conceptual core, the 
Figure ignores a host of complexities, including unpredictability and 
varying productivity of innovations, to just name two simplifications.65 
Figure 1 portrays innovations as blocks that build on each other, either 
dirtytech (depicted with dashed black lines) or cleantech (depicted with 
diagonal solid green lines). For simplicity, suppose that there exist two 
types of production, clean and dirty, and both produce essentially the same 
thing:66 electrons flowing through wires. Each innovation reduces the cost 
 
 
(1991) (describing multiple equilibria in the case of race relations).  
62.  Michael A. Cusumano et al., Strategic Maneuvering and Mass-Market Dynamics: The 
Triumph of VHS over Beta, 66 BUS. HIST. REV. 51, 51 (1992) (providing a detailed description of this 
competition). 
63.  W. Brian Arthur, Positive Feedbacks in the Economy, 262 SCI. AM. 92, 92 (1990). 
64.  Acemoglu et al., Transition, supra note 2, at 79–80 (finding empirical evidence of a large 
gap between cleantech and dirtytech knowledge stocks). 
       65.    Furthermore, the relevant comparison is often between the cost of producing energy 
with existing installations of dirtytech versus with new installations of cleantech. It is typically cheaper 
to produce energy with existing installations because the cost of installation has already been borne. 
But, to achieve large reductions in greenhouse gas emissions, there will likely need to be large 
shutdowns of existing dirtytech installations, requiring that cleantech installation is cheaper not only 
than new installations of dirtytech but also than existing installations. 
66.  In reality, they are not literally the same; for example, the timing of electricity production 
can vary, with solar producing little electricity at night. 
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of electricity generation by some amount. The higher the stack of 
innovation blocks, the more advanced, the cheaper, and the more 
profitable electricity is to produce with the technology. The cost of 
developing electricity with the technology is depicted on the vertical axis, 
with lower costs at the top and higher costs at the bottom, reflecting how 
costs of production go down as innovation blocks go up. The private 
innovator, whose block is located at the top of the panels, has to decide 
whether to invest in cleantech or dirtytech. 
 
Figure 1. Decision-Making of a Private Innovator with Innovation 
Snowballing 
 
 
Panel A depicts the decision-making of a private innovator with no 
cleantech subsidy from the government. Under these circumstances, there 
are four dirtytech blocks (with dashed black lines) and only one cleantech 
block (with diagonal solid green lines), reflecting the reality that dirtytech 
has a century head start on cleantech. As a result of this disparity in 
knowledge stocks, dirtytech produces electricity at a much lower cost than 
cleantech, even in the presence of a carbon tax. Consider the incentives 
facing the profit-maximizing innovator. She knows that she can 
immediately commercialize an innovation in dirtytech because it would 
reduce the cost of the already-cheapest form of electricity-producing 
technology. Thus, she can profit in the near term. In contrast, if she 
innovates in cleantech, profiting in the near term is less likely. A single 
innovation—i.e., a single innovation block—will not be enough for 
cleantech to overtake dirtytech as the cheapest form of energy production 
in the short run. Instead, energy producers will continue to rely on 
dirtytech—and the cleantech innovator will receive little for her efforts. 
Dirtytech Cleantech Dirtytech Cleantech
Panel A: No Cleantech Push Panel B: Big Government Push
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Innovation Stocks
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Faced with such incentives, then, the profit-maximizing innovator will 
likely invest in dirtytech, thereby further increasing its profitability and 
entrenching its dominance. Of course, in a more complex model, some 
innovators will have such brilliant cleantech innovations that they will 
invest in cleantech even if the product would be far from 
commercialization, but the overall tendency will be for innovators to 
invest in the cutting-edge dirtytech technology, where they can earn profits 
now. 
Panel B shows the results when there is a “big push” of government-
encouraged cleantech innovation. Under this scenario, the government 
adds a large stock of cleantech innovation (four additional innovation 
blocks), thereby making cleantech cheaper than dirtytech. The whole 
reasoning then reverses: it becomes more profitable to invest in cleantech 
innovation than dirtytech innovation, meaning that subsequent innovations 
will flow without government support to cleantech. This government 
intervention pushes the innovation market over its “tipping point,” after 
which the self-perpetuating nature of innovation will drive cleantech 
growth.67 
While Figure 1 shows the decision-making of a single innovator at a 
point in time, Figure 2 shows the results of aggregating many innovators 
across time, contrasting how the stock of cleantech and dirtytech 
innovation evolve over time under the same two scenarios of no 
government intervention and a big cleantech push. The stocks are plotted 
on the vertical axis and time is plotted on the horizontal axis. As in Figure 
1, the dirtytech stock is depicted in dashed black lines and the cleantech 
stock is depicted in solid green lines. 
In Panel A, again with no government intervention, the stock of 
dirtytech innovation initially exceeds that of cleantech innovation. In the 
absence of a government intervention, the stock of dirtytech innovation 
grows more quickly than the stock of cleantech innovation, since private 
innovators will tend to innovate in the more profitable cutting-edge 
technology. The cleantech innovation stock still grows because there are 
still some very good investments worth pursuing, but since only the very 
best innovations are pursued, the stock grows slowly. As a result of the 
slower innovation rate for cleantech, the two innovation stocks diverge, 
with dirtytech’s stock pulling ever further ahead of cleantech. 
 
 
 
67.  Aghion et al., supra note 15, at 37 n.38 (describing this tipping point as the “point at which 
the market starts innovating more in clean technologies than in dirty technologies without policy 
intervention [because] the clean technology is more productive than the dirty technology”). 
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Figure 2. Innovation Stock Over Time with Innovation Snowballing 
 
 
 
Reaching the tipping point is key for the long-term impact of the 
intervention. If the government cleantech investment only leads to the 
point at which cleantech has eighty percent of the stock of dirtytech, 
cleantech will grow at a faster rate than it would have otherwise; however, 
with time, the dirtytech stock will still diverge from the cleantech stock 
because innovators will still tend to gravitate toward the cutting-edge 
technology of dirtytech. A modest intervention helps but does not achieve 
the key benefit, which is that after passing the tipping point, the private 
sector will gravitate toward cleantech and the cleantech stock will diverge 
from the dirtytech stock without additional government intervention. 
Reality differs in many ways from these stylized diagrams. First, and 
perhaps most importantly, we depicted innovation as a deterministic 
process, when it is, in fact, highly stochastic. Even without a big 
government push (Panel A in both figures), random shocks of genius may 
make a particular clean technology the lowest-cost option for some period 
of time. Alternatively, unforeseen external factors, such as the 1970s oil 
crisis, may dramatically alter the innovation investment calculus. The 
figures also do not capture real world variation across geographies and 
sectors. Without a big government push, cleantech innovators may find 
profitable market segments for their inventions, such as electricity-
constrained Hawaii.68 Thus, just because dirtytech has a head start up the 
 
 
68.  Island economics favor the deployment of rooftop solar. See Davide Savenije, Hawaii 
Provides U.S. Utilities a Glimpse of the Future, UTILITY DIVE (Jun. 11, 2014), 
http://www.utilitydive.com/news/hawaii-provides-us-utilities-a-glimpse-of-the-future/272824. See also 
Gregory C. Unruh, Escaping Carbon Lock-In, 30 ENERGY POL’Y 317, 321–22 (2002) (discussing how 
inventors have used specialized niche markets to develop and grow new technologies).  
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innovation ladder does not imply zero innovation in cleantech. However, 
notwithstanding the stochastic nature of innovation, the figures still 
capture the general tendency for innovators to flow towards technologies 
with the greatest knowledge stock—and thus the highest average returns 
on R&D—when choosing between cleantech and dirtytech. In other 
words, there is some small chance that a blockbuster clean energy 
technology will arise by chance, obviating any value in government 
intervention—but that is unlikely to happen, leaving the expected general 
tendencies in the future as the basis for government policymaking. 
Of course, innovators will pursue more profitable innovations before 
they engage in less profitable ones, likely leading to declining marginal 
returns to innovation.69 However, declining returns do not undo the impact 
of innovation snowballing, which works by shifting up the returns of the 
range of possible innovations available to innovators. That is, even if there 
are declining returns among the innovations available, those returns are 
higher with a bigger stock of existing knowledge. As a result, there is still 
a suboptimal “bias” towards investing in dirtytech innovation. Thanks in 
part to the absence of a carbon tax over the past century, the historical 
stock of innovation in dirtytech has made commercialization easier for 
dirtytech than cleantech. Put differently, dirtytech entrepreneurs benefit 
from a century’s worth of intertemporal knowledge spillovers, while 
cleantech innovators only benefit from a few decades of past innovation. 
Importantly, this bias remains even after policymakers implement a carbon 
tax. 
A general subsidy for innovation would also fail to correct this 
problem. Under a policy aimed at addressing innovation spillovers 
(Section I), both dirtytech and cleantech would receive some support, 
since neither industry fully captures the social value of their R&D. But 
such a policy would be suboptimal because it does not account for the 
historical advantage that dirty innovation has over clean innovation. Nor 
would increasing the size of a carbon tax be as good of a policy as 
specifically encouraging cleantech innovation through subsidies, for the 
reasons described in Section I. Increasing the carbon tax encourages more 
cleantech innovation, but also reduces output and causes a shift to lower-
emission but more expensive dirty technologies, which harms consumers 
and fails to produce the innovation needed to reach the innovation tipping 
point and redirect private innovators toward cleantech. 
 
 
69.  Popp, supra note 19, at 163 (finding empirical evidence of declining marginal returns to 
energy research); David Popp, ENTICE: Endogenous Technological Change in the DICE Model of 
Global Warming, 48 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 742, 749 (2004) (“Empirical work suggests that there 
are diminishing returns to energy research over time.”).  
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Innovation snowballing is more than just a theory. Recent quantitative 
work suggests it is an empirical reality. Economist David Popp, for 
instance, finds that the propensity to innovate in a given energy-efficient 
technology increases with the number of prior patents filed for each 
technology, indicating that energy innovators do, in fact, stand on the 
shoulders of past entrepreneurs, leading to innovation snowballing.70 Other 
research shows that oil shocks increase innovation in energy-saving 
technology like air conditioners and that the switch toward more 
innovation in energy-saving technology persists after the end of the oil 
shock.71 Path dependency also characterizes the trajectory of clean 
automobile innovations. In particular, a team of researchers led by Harvard 
economist Philippe Aghion shows that, when fuel prices increase, 
innovation rates in cleantech (e.g., hybrid and electric vehicles) increase 
and that these increased rates are self-perpetuating, while innovation rates 
in dirtytech (the internal combustion engine) decrease.72 Firms with a 
history in clean auto innovation are much more likely to channel their 
future research efforts towards clean technologies.73 The same is true for 
firms with histories in dirty car technologies. A firm’s future research 
agenda depends not only on its own innovation history, but also on those 
of its neighbors: a company’s propensity to innovate in clean (dirty) 
technologies increases if they are situated in countries where other firms 
focus more on clean (dirty) automobile innovation. Put differently, firms 
that are exposed to clean (dirty) innovation spillovers are more likely to 
engage in clean (dirty) innovation in the future.74 
Nor is path dependency unique to energy innovation. Empirical work, 
for example, has demonstrated that innovation snowballing affects the 
direction of pharmaceutical inventions.75 And one carefully conducted 
 
 
70.  Popp, supra note 19, at 161. 
71.  Richard G. Newell, Adam B. Jaffe & Robert N. Stavins, The Induced Innovation Hypothesis 
and Energy-Saving Technological Change, 114 Q.J. ECON. 941, 971 (1999) (showing that oil price 
spikes biased innovation in air conditioning towards producing more energy efficient units); Popp, 
supra note 19, at 160 (demonstrating that higher energy prices directed innovation towards energy-
saving inventions). 
72.  Aghion et al., supra note 15, at 1.  
73.  Id. at 63. 
74.  Research suggests that standard innovation spillovers and innovation snowballing interact 
with each other. Some evidence suggests that cleantech tends to have significantly larger standard 
spillovers than dirtytech, since larger standard spillovers imply more innovation snowballing. See 
Antoine Dechezleprêtre, Ralf Martin & Myra Mohnen, Knowledge Spillovers from Clean and Dirty 
Technologies 3 (Ctr. for Econ. Performance, Discussion Paper No. 1300, 2014) (“We find consistent 
evidence that clean patents generate larger knowledge spillovers than their dirty counterparts.”). 
75.  Daron Acemoglu & Joshua Linn, Market Size in Innovation: Theory and Evidence from the 
Pharmaceutical Industry, 119 Q.J. ECON. 1049, 1084 (2004). 
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study by economist Walker Hanlon provides strong empirical evidence 
that path dependency shaped the historical evolution of textile 
technologies.76 In particular, the American Civil War cut off the supply of 
American cotton, leading demand to temporarily shift to lower-quality 
Indian cotton. That temporary shock caused a jump in innovations for 
processing Indian cotton, which, in turn, made the quality of Indian cotton 
as good or better than American cotton. As a result, the impacts of the 
temporary innovation shock lasted past the end of the Civil War. 
Innovations in the technologies for processing Indian cotton continued to 
increase, alongside demand for Indian cotton, even after American cotton 
became available again.77 
Scholars have also mapped out the innovation stocks of a wide array of 
different technologies in an analysis of 1.8 million U.S. patents and their 
citations.78 Consistent with the theory of innovation snowballing, they find 
that technology classes with more past innovations tend to innovate 
more.79 Indeed, variation in technologies’ previous patenting activity (i.e., 
patent rates among “upstream” technologies) explains more than half of 
the aggregate variation in present patenting activity across different 
technology classes. This result suggests that the size of a technology’s 
knowledge stock is highly determinative of that technology’s future 
innovation trajectory.80 
To some, the implications of innovation snowballing may seem 
unintuitive and to others, obvious. Whatever one’s reaction, the structure 
of the analysis is profoundly different from conventional economics. In the 
conventional story, a new technology can reduce the cost of producing 
cleantech. But the key piece that the conventional story misses is the 
dynamics: how that new technology not only lowers cleantech production 
costs today but draws in future cleantech innovators, progressively 
shifting production toward cleantech, creating a snowball effect. Those 
new innovators are drawn in because, as cleantech becomes cheaper to 
produce, future innovations are closer to commercialization and 
profitability. Furthermore, as cleantech becomes cheaper and closer to 
becoming the cutting-edge technology, more people will use the 
technology, increasing the scale over which cleantech innovators can 
deploy their innovation and make a profit. Once cleantech surpasses the 
 
 
76.  Hanlon, supra note 15. 
77.  Id. 
78.  Daron Acemoglu et al., Innovation Network 1 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working 
Paper No. 22783, 2016), http://www.nber.org/papers/w22783. 
79.  Id. 
80.  Id. 
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tipping point of being the cheapest energy technology, cleantech 
innovation will snowball at a greater rate than dirtytech—thereby ensuring 
a virtuous cycle. The conventional story entirely misses these dynamics. 
Rather, it treats technological progress as if—once there is a breakthrough 
technology in solar that makes it cheaper to produce energy from the sun 
than from fossil fuels—technological progress will continue as if no such 
breakthrough had occurred and entrepreneurs would continue innovating 
in dirtytech at the same rate, even once it has been overtaken by solar. If 
policy is driven by this conventional economic view, the government loses 
the opportunity to push toward the tipping point and thereby efficiently 
and cheaply deploy the private sector to achieve greater gains for 
environmental quality at lower cost. 
Recently, MIT economist Daron Acemoglu and his coauthors have 
explored the implications of innovation snowballing for climate policy. 
Based on empirical estimates of recent innovation activity, they find that 
the cost of relying on a carbon tax alone, and not encouraging cleantech 
through subsidies, is very large, amounting to costs equal to 1.9 percent of 
consumption globally. This loss translates to approximately $1.42 trillion a 
year—or roughly a tenth of total U.S. GDP.81 Notably, this welfare loss 
arises from addressing innovation snowballing with a second-best policy 
(carbon taxes) instead of an optimal instrument (research subsidies). If 
policymakers ignored innovation snowballing altogether, and devised a 
climate plan that solely focused on the negative externality of carbon 
pollution, the efficiency loss would be substantially greater.82 
The best estimates suggest that global government R&D spending on 
cleantech is far from optimal. Acemoglu and coauthors estimate that 
government spending should account for roughly ninety percent of 
cleantech R&D funding83—a far cry from the current state where only 
forty-three percent of spending comes from the public sector. 84 And, 
 
 
81.  To arrive at this number, we take 1.9 percent of world GDP, which is approximately $75 
trillion. See Acemoglu et al., Transition, supra note 2, at 56.  
82.  Moreover, while Acemoglu’s framework accounts for the path dependency of innovation, it 
does not model the standard innovation spillovers described in Section II.A. Indeed, R&D 
subsidization in Acemoglu’s model is motivated entirely by (1) the global costs of carbon, and (2) the 
path dependency of innovation. Id. at 55. As a result, the cost estimates only reflect the efficiency 
gains that come from addressing the historical bias in cleantech and dirtytech knowledge stocks. 
Correcting for standard innovation spillovers—and suboptimal subsidies to address them—would 
therefore further add to this $1.42 trillion in efficiency gains. 
83.  Id. at 63, 86 fig.6. Figure 6 shows the optimal research subsidy starting at ninety percent 
today.  
84.  ANGUS MCCRONE ET AL., U.N. ENVIRONMENT PROGRAMME, GLOBAL TRENDS IN 
RENEWABLE ENERGY INVESTMENT 2015, 73 fig.55 (2015) (reporting government spending on 
renewable energy technologies). 
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according to a number of studies, government spending on cleantech 
R&D—which currently totals about $18 billion per year worldwide85—
falls far short of needed levels. A recent report by the International Energy 
Agency, for example, estimated that global public expenditures on clean 
energy innovation would need to increase between two- and five-fold in 
order to maintain global warming below two degrees Celsius.86 Other 
researchers have reached similar conclusions using different models and 
alternative assumptions.87 Thus, the scope for addressing innovation 
snowballing in cleantech through increased public R&D spending appears 
significant. 
B. When Does Innovation Snowballing Matter? 
This application of innovation snowballing to climate change begs the 
question: when does innovation snowballing justify government 
intervention? Nearly any line of technology can, in theory, experience 
innovation snowballing, since the accumulation of knowledge could 
increase the productivity and profitability of most technologies.88 
However, government intervention is not necessarily efficient whenever 
one technology’s knowledge stock is bigger than another’s. Instead, 
government should only direct innovation away from one technology and 
towards another if two specific requirements are satisfied: there is a policy 
 
 
85.  Estimates vary depending on the data source, year, and definition of clean technology R&D. 
According to a 2016 report published by Mission Innovation (see below for more details), the twenty-
one participating countries spent a total of $14.69 billion per year on clean energy R&D. The report 
claimed that this amount represented at least eighty percent of all related spending, which would put 
total global public expenditures on clean energy R&D at roughly $18.4 billion. MISSION INNOVATION 
SECRETARIAT, BASELINE, DOUBLING, AND NARRATIVE INFORMATION SUBMITTED BY MISSION 
INNOVATION COUNTRIES AND THE EUROPEAN UNION 2, 109 (2016). Another estimate suggests that 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries spent about €14 billion 
($19 billion US) on climate mitigation research and development in 2011. See ANTOINE 
DECHEZLEPRÊTRE ET AL., CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY, INNOVATION AND GROWTH 17 (Grantham 
Research Inst., London Sch. of Econ. 2016). However, OECD countries increased their spending on 
cleantech R&D in response to the worldwide financial crisis. Id. 
86.  See TOM KERR & JOANA CHIAVARI, INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, GLOBAL GAPS IN CLEAN 
ENERGY RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, AND DEMONSTRATION 14 (2009). 
87.  Most analyses suggest that optimal government investments in clean energy R&D are 
between two and ten times current public spending levels. See id. at 52 tbl.28 (Table 28 synthesizes 
estimates of the cleantech R&D investments needed to address climate change from a number of 
prominent studies). To be clear, these estimates represent the additional R&D spending that must 
either be induced from the private sector (e.g., through a carbon tax) or supplied directly by the 
government (i.e., to address knowledge spillovers). As such, they do not identify how much of the 
needed R&D investment would be induced by an optimal carbon tax, and how much must come from 
government coffers.  
88.  And indeed, Acemoglu and company’s careful analyses of 1.8 million U.S patents find 
strong evidence of path dependence across a wide range of different technologies. See Acemoglu et al., 
Transition, supra note 2, at 1. 
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reason to redirect investment (the “ends condition”), and the government 
has the ability to redirect innovation efficiently (the “means condition”). In 
developing these criteria, we are the first to digest this economic theory 
into implications for broader innovation policy. 
First, there must be a policy rationale for switching the innovation 
ladder from one set of technologies to another, typically a historically 
untaxed externality that both leads to underinvestment in innovation in one 
area and constitutes a reason to encourage innovation in that area.89 This is 
the “ends condition.” In the case of climate change, untaxed pollution 
externalities have yielded a huge amount of induced innovation in 
dirtytech that places it far ahead of cleantech in the innovation race.90 
Innovation can build in one particular direction for many reasons. In the 
case of Betamax, for example, innovation arguably gravitated towards 
VHS for largely idiosyncratic reasons.91 However, in the absence of an 
externality, society as a whole has little reason to redirect innovation back 
toward Betamax.92 In contrast, the same pollution externalities that gave 
dirtytech an advantage over cleantech also provide a clear policy rationale 
for directing future innovation towards cleantech and away from dirtytech, 
even once a carbon tax is in place.93 
Second, for the most effective interventions, the government must have 
the ability to redirect technological development through a limited 
intervention, after which the private sector will continue in the desired 
direction. This is the “means condition.” The key feature here is the degree 
 
 
89.  There need not be an externality involved. Idiosyncratically, innovation could take a 
direction that turns out to be inefficient. But making a compelling argument along those lines would be 
very difficult, as it would require arguing that a set of technologies that has not yet been developed 
would be more efficient than the direction that the free market took—without a reason like 
externalities to point to. See S.J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, Path Dependence, Lock-In, and 
History, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 205, 205–206 (1995) (discussing the difficulties in identifying 
instances where historical contingencies working in tandem with path dependency lead to inefficient 
market equilibria). 
90.  Acemoglu et al., Transition, supra note 2, at 79–80 (estimating a significant gap in cleantech 
and dirtytech knowledge stocks).  
91.  Arthur, supra note 63, at 92. 
92.  Notably, society’s failure to tax carbon is the sole justification for the efficiency of an 
innovation subsidy in Acemoglu’s model. See Acemoglu et al., Transition, supra note 2. 
93.  The technology trees between the two (or more) different technologies also need to be 
distinct, as it is not possible to direct technology in one particular direction if the technologies build on 
the same innovation stock. In the context of cleantech and dirtytech, however, evidence suggests that 
they are largely distinct. JOELLE NOAILLY & VICTORIA SHESTALOVA, CPB NETH. BUREAU FOR ECON. 
POL’Y ANALYSIS, ON WHICH TECHNOLOGIES DO RENEWABLE ENERGY INNOVATIONS BUILD ON? 1 
(2013) (finding few spillovers between renewable and fossil-fuel technologies in a patent citation 
analysis); Rob Aalbers et al., Innovation Policy for Directing Technical Change in the Power Sector, 
63 ENERGY POL’Y 1240, 1243 (2013) (reviewing empirical studies that indicate that cleantech builds 
largely on prior cleantech inventions). 
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of substitutability between the current technology (e.g., dirtytech) and the 
desired technology (e.g., cleantech). By substitutability, we mean the 
degree to which two goods are interchangeable.94 Substitutability allows 
technological development to be highly skewed in one particular direction. 
If two products are effectively identical in terms of services provided, then 
consumers can easily flock to the cheapest one. A high degree of 
substitutability therefore creates vastly greater potential for a one-time 
intervention to push a new technology over a tipping point. Once the costs 
of the emergent technology fall below those of the dominant technology, 
consumers will quickly switch to the new technology, bringing with them 
new private-sector innovation that will spur even greater cost declines, 
even after the public-sector push has abated. Equivalently, one can think 
of high substitutability as moving innovation closer to a zero-sum game. If 
two technologies are perfect substitutes, then one technology’s gain (in 
terms of new adoptees) is the other’s loss, since both are competing for the 
same pool of customers. In contrast, if the two technologies provide 
entirely unrelated services, then one technology’s gain has no bearing on 
the other technology’s market share.95 In the former instance, a 
government push can redirect customers from one technology to another; 
in the latter case, government subsidization of one technology will not 
attract customers from the other. 
Table 1 provides examples of technology pairs that satisfy or fail to 
satisfy the means and ends conditions. The top right box represents the 
case where the ends condition but not the means condition is met. 
Consider the competition between innovation in malaria medication and 
hair loss medication. Suppose that the government wants to correct a 
strong unwarranted bias in the innovation system in favor of hair loss pills 
(a medication of the rich) instead of malaria pills (a medication of the 
poor).96 The “externality” in this case could be conceptualized as the 
 
 
94.  Acemoglu et al., Environment and Technical Change, supra note 11, at 133 (explaining 
substitutability in this context). 
95.  Acemoglu describes substitutability as the key factor that trades off competing factors: the 
price effect vs. the market size effect. See Acemoglu, supra note 15, at 783. See also Acemoglu et al, 
Environment and Technical Change, supra note 11, at 132. The price effect directs innovation to areas 
where the price of the output good is high. That is, if it costs a lot to make something, the 
correspondingly high prices drive innovators to work in that area to reduce costs and thereby reap 
profits. On the other hand, large market sizes—and therefore a large number of customers—also 
attract more innovation, since the innovators can benefit from selling to more people. It is the 
substitutability of the targeted innovation sector that determines which of the two effects will 
dominate. When there is relatively high substitutability, as between cleantech and dirtytech 
technology, the price effect matters relatively little, since there is little reason to invest in an expensive 
technology when there is a close substitute for it; instead, the market size effect dominates. Id. 
96.  This hypothetical set-up has roots in the real world. Bill Gates and others have criticized the 
marketplace for skewing research funding towards male baldness research and away from malaria 
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public’s preference for innovation that is broadly equitable across the 
income distribution. So, the ends condition is satisfied. 
 
Table 1. When Innovation Snowballing Justifies Government 
Intervention 
 
 
Ends Condition: Policy Reason to 
Redirect Technological Development? 
No Yes 
Means 
Condition: 
Technologies 
Substitutable? 
No 
Coffee makers vs. 
flat-screen TVs 
Malaria vs. 
hair loss pills 
Yes Betamax vs. VCR 
 
Cleantech vs. 
dirtytech 
 
Government Intervention 
Justified Only Here 
 
 
 
But the means condition is not satisfied. In the case of cleantech, once the 
government has a big push, the grid can largely switch over to cleantech 
because both cleantech and dirtytech produce a nearly identical final good: 
energy. Of course, cleantech and dirtytech are not perfectly substitutable. 
There are, for example, intermittency problems with solar and wind, 
which, in turn, makes battery technology an important part of the 
cleantech technology ladder.97 Irrespective of this imperfect 
substitutability, cleantech is far more substitutable for dirtytech than 
malaria pills are for hair loss pills. If there were a big push in malaria 
medication, malaria medication would not “overtake” hair loss pills; 
rather, both would continue being produced even after the big push, since 
 
 
vaccine studies. See Olivia Solon, Bill Gates: Capitalism Means Male Baldness Research Gets More 
Funding Than Malaria, WIRED (Mar. 14, 2013), http://www.wired.co.uk/article/bill-gates-capitalism. 
97.  Steven Chu & Arun Majumdar, Opportunities and Challenges for a Sustainable Energy 
Future, 488 NATURE 294, 300 (2012) (underscoring the need to develop storage technologies to 
address the intermittency problems of renewable energy technologies like solar).  
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a reduction in the cost of malaria pills will only marginally affect the 
demand for hair loss pills. In other words, the value of the government’s 
trying to redirect technological development is quite small in this scenario 
because the means condition is not satisfied. 
Now consider the bottom left corner, where the means but not the ends 
condition is satisfied. The competition between Betamax and VCR is a 
good example of this square. Betamax and VCR are quite substitutable, so 
a government intervention making Betamax the better, cheaper technology 
would redirect innovation away from VCRs and toward Betamax (though 
Betamax would need to become good enough and cheap enough to also 
overcome the issue that people already had large supplies of VCR tapes, 
an issue not relevant for electricity production, since cleantech and 
dirtytech produce the same electrons). However, the ends condition is not 
satisfied, since most people believe that there is no societal justification 
for the government to intervene in favor of Betamax. Owning a VCR does 
not harm others. Nor are the benefits of Betamax innovation more 
equitably distributed across the income distribution than those associated 
with VHS. The choice between DVDs and VCRs, or between LCDs and 
cathode ray tubes for TVs, may also belong in this box: they are 
substitutable, but there is little reason to redirect research. 
The top left corner represents those cases where neither the means nor 
the ends condition is satisfied. One can imagine a host of fanciful 
combinations of goods and services that are not substitutes and do not 
provide a policy rationale for switching from one to another: coffee-
makers and flat-screen TVs, diapers and laser jet printers, sunscreen and 
impotence drugs, umbrellas and dog leashes (indeed, these last two are 
probably complements rather than substitutes). 
It is only the bottom right corner, which includes the race between 
cleantech and dirtytech, that has the means and ends conditions satisfied: 
there is a reason to redirect because of the pollution externality and the 
means to do so because cleantech and dirtytech are substitutable. 
Determining where else innovation snowballing justifies government 
intervention will require more work. No other area has the breadth of 
documentation on the environmental externalities or the amount of path 
dependence.99 That said, one tentative area for consideration might be the 
 
 
99.  The field of climate change science has been growing at an exponential rate. For example, 
according to one careful analysis of more than 220,000 research publications on global warming, the 
total number of peer-reviewed climate papers doubles every 5–6 years. See Robin Haunschild et al., 
Climate Change Research in View of Bibliometrics, 11 PLOS ONE 1, 1 (2016). On the other hand, only 
a few studies have empirically documented innovation snowballing outside of the climate-energy 
context. See, e.g., Acemoglu & Linn, supra note 75 (providing empirical evidence of directed 
technical change in pharmaceutical research); Hanlon, supra note 15 (providing empirical evidence of 
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choice between innovation that makes labor more productive versus 
innovation that makes capital (i.e., machines) more productive. Similar to 
the hair loss-malaria example, the “externality” in this case can be 
considered a preference that the public has for relative income equality. 
Capital and labor are fairly substitutable100—at least robotic drivers can 
more easily replace human drivers than malaria medication can replace 
hair loss medication. So, there is an externality and moderately high 
substitutability. Furthermore, some believe that, as capital has become 
more abundant in recent decades,101 the benefits to investing in making 
capital more productive may have expanded accordingly. In other words, 
path dependency seems to characterize the development of labor- and 
capital-augmenting technologies. Taken together, these considerations 
would suggest that innovation policy might consider favoring labor-
augmenting policies (e.g., apps to call human drivers or rooftop solar, 
which involve lots of relatively low-income laborers) over capital-
augmenting policies (e.g., robotic drivers or improvements in nuclear 
energy, which largely increase returns to capital). Of course, this example 
is highly speculative. Knowing the ultimate economic incidence of 
innovation is very difficult. And, it is not even clear that the technology 
ladders of “labor-tech” and “capital-tech” are distinct, which is of course 
also a prerequisite.102 After all, if labor-tech and capital-tech build on the 
same innovation stock, the government cannot possibly redirect innovation 
from one to the other. But we offer this example to illustrate the other 
kinds of innovation policy that might be implicated, without making any 
concrete recommendations. 
In cleantech and perhaps in other areas where these two conditions are 
satisfied, there is a strong case for government intervention to redirect 
technological intervention on the basis of innovation snowballing. Of 
course, our argument does not eliminate many of the traditional critiques 
of government policies encouraging the development of certain 
 
 
path dependent innovation in textile technologies).  
100.  Daron Acemoglu, Why Do New Technologies Complement Skills? Directed Technical 
Change and Wage Inequality, 113 Q.J. ECON. 1055 (1998); Acemoglu, supra note 15, at 804. 
101.  THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 25–26 (Arthur Goldhammer 
trans., 2014). 
102.  For example, it is unclear whether robots are labor-augmenting, capital-augmenting, or both. 
See, e.g., Mark Muro & Scott Andes, Robots Seem to Be Improving Productivity, Not Costing Jobs, 
HARV. BUS. REV. (Jun. 16, 2015), https://hbr.org/2015/06/robots-seem-to-be-improving-productivity-
not-costing-jobs (surveying some empirical evidence suggesting that innovation in robotics may 
increase labor productivity); The Growth of Industrial Robots, THE ECONOMIST: GRAPHIC DETAIL 
(Mar. 27, 2017), https://www.economist.com/blogs/graphicdetail/2017/03/daily-chart-19 (arguing that 
“the relationship between automation and employment is not always straightforward”). 
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technologies over others, even in a way as circumscribed as encouraging 
cleantech over dirtytech. For example, how is the government to know 
which technologies will be most effective at achieving emissions 
reductions? What role should nuclear energy play? What about rooftop 
solar versus solar farms? Indeed, innovation snowballing in some ways 
increases the risks of misprediction, by creating the possibility that 
government intervention could start snowballing in an area that turns out 
to be inefficient. The debate over using government expertise to intervene 
in the economy is an old one, and this Article will not resolve it.103 
On the one hand, the government makes predictive judgments in many 
areas where there are good reasons to think that the free market on its own 
will yield inefficient outcomes. The Federal Reserve predicts economic 
conditions. The Department of Defense, Department of State, and 
intelligence agencies make predictions about geopolitical conditions. And, 
indeed, even a carbon tax would necessarily involve significant predictive 
and normative judgments, including guesses about the future impacts of 
greenhouse gas emissions on sea levels and value choices about the 
appropriate discount rate.104 The likelihood of misprediction may be 
greater for government programs that encourage cleantech over dirtytech, 
but they do not go away for a carbon tax, which has the support of many 
free-market proponents.105 Rather, for all these policy decisions, the 
government uses market signals and the knowledge of experts—scientists, 
economists, diplomats, military experts, and businesspeople—to make its 
best guesses. Where there are sound reasons to think that government 
intervention can do some good, many would not hesitate to use 
government intervention, while remaining vigilant to its weaknesses. 
On the other hand, many are more concerned about mispredictions, 
government capture, and other perversities of government intervention. 
They argue for caution in using government expertise to intervene in the 
economy. And some suggest a much more limited role for government 
than currently exists. One can debate whether the cure of government 
intervention is worse than the disease of an inefficient market outcome. 
 
 
103.  See generally F.A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519 
(1945); FRIEDRICH HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM (1944); MILTON FRIEDMAN & ROSE FRIEDMAN, 
FREE TO CHOOSE (1980). 
104.  See William Pizer et al., Using and Improving the Social Cost of Carbon, 346 SCI. 1189, 
1189–90 (2014); Richard L. Revesz & Matthew R. Shahabian, Climate Change and Future 
Generations, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 1097, 1163 (2011); Douglas A. Kysar, Discounting . . . On Stilts, 74 
U. CHI. L. REV. 119, 136 (2007); Michael Greenstone, Elizabeth Kopits & Ann Wolverton, 
Developing a Social Cost of Carbon for US Regulatory Analysis: A Methodology and Interpretation, 7 
REV. ENVTL. ECON. & POL’Y 23, 31–32 (2013). 
105.  See, e.g., Martin S. Feldstein, Ted Halstead & N. Gregory Mankiw, Opinion, A Conservative 
Case for Climate Action, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2017. 
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But innovation snowballing makes clear that the market outcome—even 
with optimal carbon taxes and general innovation policy—is, indeed, 
inefficient. Innovation snowballing articulates a clear market failure, while 
recognizing that there is room for disagreement over the appropriate policy 
response. Indeed, in advocating for the consideration of innovation 
snowballing, this Article suggests a return to an early goal of 
environmental law of pushing environmentally friendly innovation, though 
not its means of command and control regulations.106 In the next two 
sections, we discuss how innovation snowballing affects policy choices 
when confronting these and other tradeoffs. 
III. DOMESTIC POLICY 
Countries can deploy a myriad of domestic policies to increase their 
production of cleantech innovation. On the one hand, governments can 
directly subsidize innovation through grants, prizes, patents, and R&D tax 
credits. On the other hand, they can indirectly impact innovation through 
pollution performance standards, clean energy deployment subsidies, 
government procurement programs, and other “non-innovation” policies. 
Here, we work out for the first time the implications of innovation 
snowballing for the choice of innovation and non-innovation policies. 
Before proceeding, we pause to summarize in Table 2 the implications 
of spillovers and snowballing for cleantech innovation policy. In 
particular, this matrix asks when policymakers should encourage 
technology-neutral development, target cleantech innovation, or support 
specific types of technologies within cleantech. This table assumes the 
presence of both an optimal carbon tax and innovation spillovers for 
cleantech equal in size to those for other technologies. If there are no 
innovation externalities, as portrayed in column (1), decision-makers have 
no economic justification for encouraging innovation at all. There is no 
problem to solve, so the government should not intervene. If there are only 
innovation spillovers, as in column (2), the government should deploy 
technology-neutral innovation policy, but should not pick cleantech over 
dirtytech and certainly should not subsidize some cleantech technologies 
over others. If there is only innovation snowballing, as in column (3), then 
there is no reason to encourage technology in general, but there is a reason 
to target cleantech—and, as the sections below will touch on, a reason to 
even target within cleantech, to the extent that some cleantech innovations 
 
 
106.  See supra notes 50–55 and accompanying text. 
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involve technologies that disproportionately build up the cleantech 
innovation tree over the dirtytech innovation tree. 
 
Table 2. Implications of Spillovers and Snowballing for Cleantech 
Innovation Policy 
     (1) Neither 
Spillovers nor 
Snowballing 
(2) Only 
Innovation 
Spillovers 
(3) Only 
Innovation 
Snowballing 
Encourage all 
innovation 
neutrally? 
     No     Yes        No 
Target 
cleantech 
innovation? 
     No      No       Yes 
Target within 
cleantech 
innovation? 
     No      No  Sometimes 
 
A. Innovation Policy 
For ease of analysis, we distill cleantech innovation policy design into 
three main questions: 
1. Where should government intervene in the innovation 
process? That is, how should government allocate support 
between basic research, applied research, and development? 
2. When should government intervene? That is, what should 
the trajectory of innovation subsidies for cleantech look like over 
the coming years and decades? 
3. How should government intervene? That is, which 
innovation tools—including patents, prizes, R&D tax credits, and 
grants—look more attractive in light of innovation snowballing? 
In the following subsections, we examine how innovation snowballing 
informs each of these considerations. 
1. Where? 
Thus far, we have largely refrained from delving into the details of the 
innovation process. We have, instead, treated innovation as a unitary event 
for ease of exposition. In reality innovation is better conceptualized as a 
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production pipeline that consists of three main stages.107 At the beginning, 
scientists and laboratories engage in basic research, which produces 
knowledge with little regard to commercialization.108 Basic research, in 
turn, provides the building blocks for applied research, which aims to 
solve specific real-world problems with commercial value.109 Applied 
research subsequently leads to the development of commercial goods and 
services—and, eventually, commercialization.110 
According to conventional economic wisdom, governments should 
focus support on more basic forms of research because innovation 
spillovers decrease in size as a technology approaches 
commercialization.111 There are two reasons why the gap between the 
social and private returns to research may be particularly large for basic 
research. First, basic research can contribute to a vast array of technologies 
and industries because it seeks to answer fundamental questions of science 
and society.112 In contrast, the benefits of applied and development 
research are more narrowly circumscribed because these forms of research 
seek to solve particular, practical problems. For example, research to 
improve the efficiency of wind turbines will likely have limited impact on 
the development of new pharmaceuticals. But research on a new 
optimization algorithm might find applications in both wind energy and 
pharmaceutical markets. As a result, the social value of basic research is 
greater than that of applied or development research because basic 
research benefits more industries.113 
 
 
107.  There are many different taxonomies of the innovation process. For the purposes of this 
analysis, we opt for the simple and well-established linear model. Benoit Godin, Invention, Diffusion 
and Linear Models of Innovation: The Contribution of Anthropology to a Conceptual Framework, 15 
J. INNOVATION ECON. & MGMT. 11, 11 (2014). 
108.  See Federal Funds Glossary, NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION, FEDERAL FUNDS SURVEY, 
https://www.nsf.gov/statistics/fedfunds/glossary/def.htm (last visited July 28, 2017) (“In basic research 
the objective of the sponsoring agency is to gain more complete knowledge or understanding of the 
fundamental aspects of phenomena and of observable facts, without specific applications toward 
processes or products in mind.”). 
109.  Id. (“In applied research the objective of the sponsoring agency is to gain knowledge or 
understanding necessary for determining the means by which a recognized need may be met.”). 
110.  Id. (“Development is systematic use of the knowledge or understanding gained from 
research, directed toward the production of useful materials, devices, systems, or methods, including 
design and development of prototypes, and processes.”). 
111.  There are, of course, other factors weighing in favor of government support for more basic 
forms of research. Perhaps most prominently, the risk that government will crowd out private 
investments in innovation is lowest for basic research. Indeed, economist David Popp provides 
evidence that government energy R&D acted as a substitute for private investments in energy R&D 
during the 1970s, but then later as a complement. The author suggests that this change may be due to a 
shift in the government’s focus from applied to basic energy research. See Popp, supra note 19, at 177. 
112.  For one of the first statements of this argument, see Nelson, supra note 19, at 302. 
113.  And indeed, several empirical studies show that the social returns to research are higher for 
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Second, appropriating the commercial value of basic research is 
difficult.114 It can take decades for basic research to turn into a patentable 
and commercially valuable product—making such research vulnerable to 
appropriation by competitors.115 In addition, while a firm may recognize 
the value of a basic scientific breakthrough to its own industry, it is much 
less equipped to identify applications in other fields.116 As a result, a firm 
will likely only patent a small subset of applications arising from their 
basic science research. Scholars therefore believe that the appropriability 
of innovation declines as research becomes more basic, even as the social 
value of the research increases.117 Consequently, the wedge between the 
social and private returns to R&D—and thus the need for government 
invention—tends to be greatest for basic research with standard innovation 
spillovers. 
Innovation snowballing, however, undercuts the traditional emphasis 
on basic research for two reasons. First, government support for cleantech 
is most effective in the long run if it ultimately enables the cleantech 
knowledge stock to overcome the dirtytech knowledge stock. If an 
intervention reduces, but does not reverse, the cleantech-dirtytech gap in 
innovation, innovation snowballing will continue to favor dirtytech, 
ultimately causing the two technologies to diverge once more. The key, 
then, is reaching the tipping point at which cleantech is the more 
profitable, cutting edge technology. And the whole R&D process—from 
basic research to commercial development—helps achieve that goal, since 
all stages contribute to the cleantech knowledge stock. Indeed, it is only 
commercialization that can ultimately push cleantech over the tipping 
point, since products that are not commercialized are rarely cost-
competitive and therefore rarely profitable. Thus, on the basis of 
innovation snowballing, government should encourage innovation across 
the research pipeline in order to reach the tipping point. 
 
 
basic than for applied or development research. See Hall, Mairesse & Mohnen, supra note 3. 
114.  For summaries of this argument, see Nelson, supra note 19, at 302. 
115.  See Hall, Mairesse & Mohnen, supra note 3 (concluding from the empirical literature that 
“basic R&D is really long-term R&D.”).  
116.  See Nelson, supra note 19, at 302; Ufuk Akcigit et al., Back to Basics: Private and Public 
Investment in Basic R&D and Macroeconomic Growth 1, 2 (NBER Working Paper No. 19473, 2013) 
(describing how “firms operating in more industries will be able to utilize more facets of a given basic 
information”). 
117.  Nathan Rosenberg, Why Do Firms Do Basic Research (With Their Own Money)?, 19 RES. 
POL’Y 165, 165 (1990) (noting that appropriability decreases because levels of “uninsurable risk and 
uncertainty” increase as research moves towards “the basic research end of the research spectrum”); 
Adam B. Jaffe, The Importance of “Spillovers” in the Policy Mission of the Advanced Technology 
Program, 23 J. TECH. TRANSFER 11, 14 (1998) (observing that the long lag times between discovery 
and commercialization increases the size of knowledge spillovers for more basic forms of research). 
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Second, innovation snowballing raises concerns that more basic 
research may accidentally end up promoting dirtytech instead of cleantech 
innovation. Recall that the key point about innovation snowballing is not 
the extent to which the benefits of research are unpatentable or otherwise 
not appropriated by innovators. Innovation snowballing exists even with 
perfect patentability. Rather, innovation snowballing works through 
changing the productivity of innovating in one line of research versus 
another: if the stock of knowledge in cleantech increases, future 
innovations in cleantech become more valuable because they can build on 
a larger stock of knowledge, infrastructure, and market share. But, as 
discussed above, predicting how a basic research breakthrough—which, 
by definition, has potential applications across a variety of fields—will 
make its way to the market is difficult. As a result, investments in earlier 
stages of the research pipeline run a greater risk of not benefitting 
cleantech or of even benefiting dirtytech instead of cleantech—and 
thereby perversely widening the clean-dirty knowledge gap. In contrast, 
there is more certainty in later-stage developments about an innovation’s 
contribution to the cleantech innovation tree, which, in turn, lowers the 
risk of perverse spillovers to dirtytech.118 That being said, we stress that 
we are not arguing for limiting basic research. Quite the opposite. The 
large innovation spillovers from basic research justify strong technology-
neutral government support. We merely suggest that innovation 
snowballing argues for also subsidizing later stages of the cleantech 
innovation pipeline. 
2. When? 
Innovation snowballing offers insight into when governments should 
invest in cleantech R&D. In particular, innovation snowballing argues for 
a large, but temporary, government investment in cleantech innovation.119 
In contrast, conventional analyses based solely on innovation spillovers 
suggest that innovations should simply be subsidized to the extent of the 
spillover,120 resulting in government support that is roughly constant over 
time. That is, conventional reasoning suggests that a present-day invention 
with a spillover of size X should receive the same subsidy as an invention 
 
 
118.  Indeed, as this Article discusses below, there is some empirical evidence suggesting that 
spillovers from cleantech to dirtytech are rare. 
119.  Acemoglu et al., Environment and Technical Change, supra note 11; Acemoglu et al., 
Transition, supra note 2, at 56. 
120.  Michael Grubb & David Ulph, Energy, the Environment, and Innovation, 18 OXFORD REV. 
ECON. POL’Y 92, 92 (2002). 
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fifty years from now with a standard spillover of size X. 
In contrast, innovation snowballing does not imply constant subsidies; 
instead, it suggests more subsidies now because innovation snowballing 
increases the costs of delaying climate change action. Without government 
intervention, innovation gravitates toward dirtytech, the most productive 
and profitable technology in today’s energy markets. Thus, each day that 
policymakers fail to act further widens the cleantech-dirtytech knowledge 
gap, making it costlier to bridge the gap in the future. Indeed, Acemoglu 
and coauthors estimate that delaying carbon pricing and cleantech R&D 
subsidization by fifty years would reduce global consumption by 1.7 
percent, as compared to the optimal policy path.121 In dollar terms, this 
welfare loss is about $1.27 trillion per year.122 
But, governments only need to disproportionately subsidize cleantech 
innovation until the productivity gap between cleantech and dirtytech 
knowledge stocks is closed. Once the system reaches this technology 
tipping point, cleantech innovation will be more productive and more 
profitable than dirtytech innovation, meaning that innovation blocks will 
begin flowing to cleantech without additional government support. Thus, 
in contrast to a tax on carbon or an innovation subsidy for spillovers, 
which should be maintained in perpetuity, innovation snowballing can be 
addressed by a large, but temporary, government investment in cleantech 
R&D. 
Path dependency also has implications for the timing of carbon prices. 
The social costs of a carbon price are high in the near term when dirtytech 
is cheaper than cleantech.123 But, as cleantech innovation—with the 
support of government funding—accelerates and surpasses dirtytech 
innovation, the cost differences between the two will decline and 
ultimately reverse. Thus, with the right cleantech innovation policy, 
emission reductions will cost less in the future than they do today, 
suggesting value in deferring some emissions reductions by deferring 
some of the carbon tax increase. This logic argues for cleantech subsidies 
and carbon taxes that fall and rise, respectively, over time.124 Under 
Acemoglu’s optimal path, for example, nearly all cleantech subsidization 
occurs within the next five decades, while carbon prices steadily increase 
 
 
121.  See Acemoglu et al., Transition, supra note 2, at 89. 
122.  As a point of reference, recall that welfare losses from solely relying on carbon taxes to 
respond to climate change totaled to about 1.9 percent of global consumption, or about $1.42 trillion a 
year. See supra note 82 and accompanying text. 
123.  Acemoglu et al., Transition, supra note 2, at 87. 
124.  Technically, Acemoglu’s optimal carbon tax follows an inverted-U-shaped path that peaks in 
roughly 130 years and then steadily declines. See id. at 86. 
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over the next 130 years.125 
While earlier investments are better for redirecting innovation, an 
immediate full ramp up would likely be undesirable. Cleantech innovation 
requires substantial specialized human capital, and empirical work 
suggests that the short-run labor supply of scientists and engineers is 
relatively inelastic.126 In other words, it will take time for innovators to 
develop the necessary expertise to enter the cleantech field.127 A petroleum 
engineer, for instance, cannot become a wind turbine mechanic overnight. 
Likewise, the educational institutions responsible for training the next 
generation of cleantech minds will not respond instantaneously to changes 
in the market for energy innovation. As a result, expanding the pool of 
cleantech human capital—and thus the knowledge stock for cleantech 
innovation—will likely require decades, not years, of government support. 
Given the inelastic supply of scientists in the short-run, a rapid increase in 
spending in innovation might drive up wages instead of increasing 
innovation.128 In contrast, a more gradual increase in cleantech R&D 
subsidization would better ensure that taxpayer dollars increase innovation 
output, rather than the salaries of scientists. In a similar vein, an optimal 
climate strategy should involve policies designed specifically to augment 
the number of cleantech entrepreneurs, such as increased funding to 
graduate students in cleantech disciplines and the development of new 
cleantech concentrations in STEM programs. 
Finally, the optimal length of subsidization will likely vary across 
individual cleantech technologies. Economists have, for example, found 
larger within-technology spillovers for wind technologies than for solar or 
energy storage technologies.129 In other words, past knowledge stocks 
contribute more to future innovations in the context of wind than in the 
context of solar or storage. As compared to wind then, solar and storage 
may require longer periods of government support to reach their respective 
technology tipping points. 
 
 
125.  Id. at 87 fig.6. 
126.  Austan Goolsbee, Does Government R&D Policy Mainly Benefit Scientists and Engineers?, 
88 AM. ECON. REV. 298, 298 (1998) (presenting empirical evidence suggesting that most R&D 
spending goes towards increasing scientist salaries in the short run). 
127.  See Shi-Ling Hsu, Capital Transitioning: A Human Capital Strategy for Climate Innovation, 
6 TRANSNAT’L ENVTL. L. 153 (2017) (for ideas on how to promote this human capital transition). 
128.  Goolsbee, supra note 126, at 301 (estimating that “a major component of government R&D 
spending is windfall gains to R&D workers.”).  
129.  Joëlle Noailly & Victoria Shestalova, Knowledge Spillovers from Renewable Energy 
Technologies: Lessons from Patent Citations 1, 18–19 (Ctr. for Int’l Envtl. Stud., Research Paper No. 
22, 2013) (providing empirical evidence that within-technology spillovers vary in size across energy 
technology types). 
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3. How? 
Innovation snowballing also influences the relative attractiveness of the 
various innovation policy tools. In an economics model, social planners 
only have access to a single, undifferentiated, intellectual property tool: 
the so-called “innovation subsidy.” But in the real world imperfectly 
informed policymakers rely on patents,130 grants,131 prizes,132 and R&D tax 
credits133 to stimulate innovation. Here, we show that innovation 
snowballing has far-reaching implications for innovation policy design, 
particularly with respect to the debate over whether regulators should 
subsidize innovation using market-based rewards (i.e., patents and R&D 
tax credits) or government-set rewards (i.e., grants and prizes).134 First, 
innovation snowballing tilts the scales against patents and in favor of 
government-set prizes and research grants. Second, it argues for directing 
subsidies not only towards cleantech in general, but also towards particular 
types of cleantech that especially build up the clean technology tree. Third, 
it increases the value of R&D tax credits relative to patents as instruments 
for spurring cleantech innovation. In the following analysis, we adopt the 
simplifying assumption that policymakers enact a kind of “pure” form of 
each policy instrument,135 meaning that patents produce monopoly rights, 
while prizes and grants produce innovations for the public domain.136 
a. Patents vs. Government-Set Tools 
Innovation snowballing substantially undercuts the main benefits of 
patents—the use of the market to determine the value of innovation, and 
the fairness of making beneficiaries pay—while exacerbating their main 
cost—the impacts of intellectual property monopolization. As a result, 
 
 
130.  Patents subsidize innovation by awarding innovators temporary rights to charge monopoly 
prices for their inventions. 
131.  Grants fund research projects that have been selected by government experts. Under this 
model, the innovation subsidy is distributed prior to the invention. 
132.  Prizes transfer taxpayer dollars to private entrepreneurs who win research competitions. 
Funds are distributed after the invention.  
133.  Tax credits reduce the entrepreneur’s tax burden in accordance with her expenditures on 
specified R&D activities. 
134.  We use Daniel Hemel and Lisa Ouellette’s classification of innovation tools into 
government-set and market-set rewards. See Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 6, at 327.  
135.  We return to R&D tax credits below. See infra Section III.A.3.c. 
136.  It need not be the case that recipients of government funds waive patenting rights. For 
example, under the Bayh-Dole Act, recipients of government grants can patent. Bayh-Dole Act of 
1980, 35 U.S.C. § 202 (2012). Similarly, under the recently-passed 21st Century Cures Act, winners of 
innovation prize competitions can patent their inventions. 21st Century Cures Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 
1001(i)(1), 201 (2016). 
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innovation snowballing makes patents less attractive and government-set 
tools, like prizes and research grants, more appealing in the context of 
cleantech. 
Much of the debate over optimal innovation policy focuses on whether 
markets or governments are better situated to identify and reward 
promising new technologies. 137 On the one hand, market-based 
instruments rely on price signals—rather than government experts—to 
allocate innovation subsidies to private entrepreneurs. Under the patent 
system, for instance, innovation subsidies come in the form of temporary 
monopolies.138 As a result, markets determine remuneration levels for an 
invention and private actors decide which research projects to 
undertake.139 In contrast, government-set innovation rewards rely on 
public experts to disburse innovation subsidies.140 Grants, for instance, 
fund specific research proposals that are selected by government 
specialists, while innovation competitions are designed to produce specific 
inventions (e.g., a car that can drive 100 miles to the gallon) by rewarding 
the winners with taxpayer dollars. Under both tools, then, the government 
determines which technologies to subsidize and the level of remuneration. 
The relative strengths and weaknesses of government-set and market-
set innovation instruments are well-known—and this Article does not 
purport to comprehensively survey the literature.141 Instead, we simply 
show here that innovation snowballing undercuts some of the main 
reasons for preferring market-set tools, in general, and patents, in 
particular. Specifically, the conventional view among many economists 
and legal scholars is that markets are better than the government at 
identifying commercially viable innovations.142 Relative to the 
entrepreneurs themselves, government experts face severe informational 
constraints in assessing the costs, risks, and value of private R&D—and 
therefore in identifying which innovations are worth pursuing and how 
much to invest in each.143 Markets, in contrast, incorporate the preferences 
 
 
137.  Roin, supra note 18, at 999 (noting that this “debate over which system is preferable has 
existed for centuries”); Shavell & van Ypersele, supra note 18, at 525–27 (describing the longstanding 
debate between patents and rewards).  
138.  Stiglitz, supra note 31, at 1700. 
139.  Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 6, at 327–28. 
140.  Id. 
141.  For a comprehensive review of this literature, see Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 6, at 327; 
and Roin, supra note 18, at 999.  
142.  Kapczynski, supra note 18, at 974–75 (discussing both the dominant view of intellectual 
property and the “long and important tradition of dissent”). 
143.  Nancy Gallini & Suzanne Scotchmer, Intellectual Property: When Is It the Best Incentive 
System?, 2 INNOVATION POL’Y & ECON. 51, 54–55 (2002). 
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of billions of people: an innovation that will benefit large segments of the 
population will yield large expected profits, which, in turn, will induce 
innovation by private actors through the invisible hand of price signals. As 
a result, a major purported advantage of the patent system is that the 
market sets the remuneration for innovation.144 
Market signals, however, are much less valuable in a regime with 
innovation snowballing. As discussed above, many initial cleantech 
innovations will not be very profitable, even though they will be essential 
to switching society from a dirtytech to a cleantech equilibrium. Indeed, 
path dependency arises precisely because innovation gravitates towards 
technologies with the most productive and profitable knowledge stocks. 
As a result, markets may serve as a poor guide for addressing innovation 
snowballing because the market itself is not a neutral arbiter in the case of 
energy technologies. Because dirtytech has benefited from over a century 
of extra innovation resulting from an untaxed pollution externality, the 
present innovation playing field is tilted inefficiently towards dirtytech.145 
Consequently, even with a tax on carbon, market-set instruments that are 
technology-agnostic cannot efficiently address innovation snowballing by 
correcting for this market bias. Instead, optimal innovation policy 
necessitates discrimination between cleantech and dirtytech. 
Patents have also been justified on fairness grounds by the 
“beneficiaries pay” principle, since patents typically require the 
beneficiaries and users of an innovation to pay for it.146 Innovation 
snowballing, however, undercuts this logic as well. The costs of greater 
cleantech patent protection are borne disproportionately by large energy 
users and future cleantech innovators. But closing the cleantech-dirtytech 
knowledge gap and moving society to a cleantech equilibrium benefits all 
of humanity by efficiently reducing the risk of climate change and the 
costs of climate change mitigation. As a result, the beneficiaries pay 
principle actually argues against cleantech patents and in favor of 
cleantech grants, prizes, and R&D tax credits—each of which can spread 
 
 
144.  Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 6, at 327–28. 
145.  Of course, we are not the first to observe that market signals do not always correlate tightly 
with social value. See, e.g., Amy Kapczynski & Talha Syed, The Continuum of Excludability and the 
Limits of Patents, 122 YALE L.J. 1900, 1900 (2013). But we are the first to discuss how innovation 
snowballing undercuts the value of market-set innovation tools as drivers of socially-beneficial 
inventions.  
146.  For a thorough treatment of this argument, see Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 6, at 345–52; 
Richard S. Gruner, Why We Need a Strong Patent System and When: Filling the Void Left by the Bilski 
Case, 28 SANTA CLARA COMPUT. & HIGH TECH. L.J. 499, 506 (2012) (arguing that one of the patent 
system’s advantages is that “the rewards are paid by the specific users of inventions”). 
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the costs of innovation subsidization across the populace through, say, a 
general income tax. 
In addition to reducing the benefits of patents, innovation snowballing 
exacerbates the costs of patents relative to government-set tools that do not 
place intellectual property in private hands. Patents’ major disadvantage is 
that the monopoly rights granted to innovators under a patent system 
increase the cost of using the resulting intellectual property above its 
marginal cost, thereby reducing the technology’s use among two important 
groups: producers who use the innovation to make a product (e.g., 
electricity) and entrepreneurs who use the innovation to develop future 
innovations.147 Thus patents—especially those on foundational 
concepts148—can impede innovations from being added to the innovation 
stock (i.e., make the “shoulders of giants” smaller than they could be).149 
For example, companies with patents can, in theory, entirely prevent 
others from using its technology for the duration of the patent; at a 
minimum, they will likely charge more than the zero marginal cost of the 
use of the idea. Likewise, patents can create an anti-commons problem: if 
a new potential innovation requires as inputs a variety of past innovations, 
each of which is patented by a different company, then the costs of 
acquiring all those licenses may be prohibitively high.150 Innovation 
snowballing makes the monopoly pricing and transaction costs under the 
 
 
147.  For a thorough discussion of all the ways in which patents can delay or disincentivize 
innovation, see Jerome Reichman et al., Intellectual Property and Alternatives: Strategies for Green 
Innovation 10 (Chatham House Energy, Env’t and Dev. Programme Paper, No. 08/03, 2008). See also 
Jay P. Kesan, Economic Rationales for the Patent System in Current Context, 22 GEO. MASON L. REV. 
897, 900 (2015) (arguing that broad patents can “deter[] other potential inventors from working on the 
same or similar issues,” leading to a decline in innovation activity); David S. Olson, Taking the 
Utilitarian Basis for Patent Law Seriously: The Case for Restricting Patentable Subject Matter, 82 
TEMP. L. REV. 181, 183 (2009) (“It is also well recognized that our patent system’s mechanism for 
incentivizing innovation—granting property rights to inventors—causes deadweight loss to society in 
the form of higher prices, and some consumers ending up priced out of the market.”).  
148.  Reichman et al., supra note 147, at 10 (describing how “progress in the automobile and 
aircraft industries was hampered by problems in licensing broad patents on foundational platforms”). 
149.  See id. at 10–12 (reviewing the means by which patents can delay or disincentivize 
innovation); Suzanne Scotchmer, supra note 14, at 30 (discussing how patents can slow second 
generation or follow-up inventions). 
150.  See Michael A. Heller and Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? 
Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCI. 698, 698 (1998) (discussing the anti-commons 
problem in the context of biomedical research); Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross 
Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard Setting, in 1 INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 119, 119 
(Adam B. Jaffe et al. eds., 2000) (discussing how a patent thicket—or “overlapping set of patent rights 
requiring that those seeking to commercialize new technology obtain licenses from multiple 
patentees”—can slow innovation growth). In the field of energy technologies, there is also a risk that 
patents will yield anti-innovative effects. See Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Addressing the Green Patent 
Global Deadlock Through Bayh-Dole Reform, 119 YALE L.J. 1727 (2010) (offering evidence of the 
existence of anti-commons problems in the energy technology space).  
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patent system all the more perverse. Path dependency follows from 
innovators “standing on the shoulders of giants,” and patents make it even 
harder to stand on those shoulders, hindering innovation snowballing. 
Admittedly, patents’ negative impact on the growth of the cleantech 
knowledge stock may be partially counterbalanced by patents’ tendency to 
incentivize inventors to publicize their inventions.151 Without patents, 
companies would have greater incentives to hide their innovative 
breakthroughs from the public (e.g., more inventions would be treated as 
trade secrets). And an innovation that is hidden from the world cannot 
serve as a building block in the cleantech knowledge stock. However, we 
suspect that the information-forcing properties of patents do not fully 
compensate for the innovation tool’s clear downsides. Instead, this 
discussion highlights an important role for publicity requirements in prizes 
and government funding.152 
In sum, innovation snowballing increases the value of government-set 
innovation tools and decrease the value of patents.153 Of course, we do not 
mean to imply that innovation snowballing overturns the well-known risks 
to government intervention. The government cannot tell the future. It faces 
severe information constraints—and more discretionary forms of 
innovation spending, such as prizes154 and grants, are also more vulnerable 
to lobbying and political interference.155 These factors remain concerning. 
This Article simply points out that innovation snowballing undermines the 
usefulness of patents—and the market more generally—for guiding 
cleantech innovation. 
 
 
151.  Roberto Mazzoleni & Richard R. Nelson, The Benefits and Costs of Strong Patent 
Protection: A Contribution to the Current Debate, 27 RES. POL’Y 273, 278 (1998) (discussing how 
“patents encourage and provide a vehicle for disclosure and, more generally, generate quick and wide 
diffusion of the technical information underlying new inventions”); Note, The Disclosure Function of 
the Patent System (Or Lack Thereof), 118 HARV. L. REV. 2007, 2007 (2005) (showing that the courts 
“place a great deal of emphasis on the patent system’s role in disseminating information”). 
152.  Vincenzo Denicolò & Luigi Alberto Franzoni, The Contract Theory of Patents, 23 INT’L 
REV. L. & ECON. 365, 368 (2004) (arguing that the patent system “induces disclosure of marginal 
innovations”). There is, of course, a robust and unresolved debate over the empirical extent to which 
patents induce the disclosure of meaningful information to the public. See Jason Rantanen, Peripheral 
Disclosure, 74 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 1 (2012). We do not take a stand on this question. Rather, we simply 
stress that policy instruments that slow the incorporation of cleantech innovation into the cleantech 
knowledge stock will likely exacerbate innovation snowballing. 
153.  And, of course, all this reasoning works in reverse with respect to dirtytech. Patents are an 
appropriate tool for dirtytech, in that they encourage the next round of innovation today, but make it 
difficult (relative to prizes) to build on prior developments. 
154.  For those who fear that a federal climate prize is unlikely to be feasible, perhaps such a prize 
would be feasible from a consortium of states. 
155.  See, e.g., MICHAEL J. GRAETZ, THE END OF ENERGY 188 (2011). Harold Demsetz provides 
one of the earliest and most influential defenses of the patent system, partly on informational and 
political economy grounds. See generally Harold Demsetz, Information and Efficiency: Another 
Viewpoint, 12 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1969). 
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b. Targeting Innovation Support 
This Article makes a case for government policies directing innovation 
to cleantech over dirtytech. But how should it do so? While the previous 
subsection discussed the issues involved in picking cleantech over 
dirtytech, this subsection argues that the government should encourage not 
only cleantech over dirtytech but also certain kinds of cleantech over 
others. 
Thus far, we have portrayed cleantech (low greenhouse gas energy 
sources) and dirtytech (high greenhouse gas energy sources) as forming 
two separate technology trees. The real world is not so neat. In reality, 
there is a continuum of building blocks of those technology trees, from 
those contributing solely to low-greenhouse gas technologies to those 
contributing solely to high-greenhouse gas technologies. The endpoints of 
the spectrum are clear: innovation snowballing (unlike the conventional 
efficiency story) implies that a new wind turbine technology should get 
more government R&D support than a new deep-sea oil drilling or coal 
mining technology. But what about the middle of the spectrum, including 
both cleantech innovations that also contribute to the production of dirty 
energy and dirtytech innovations that make dirty energy cleaner? 
Innovation snowballing has a clear implication: focus support on the 
technology building blocks that particularly benefit the clean energy 
technology tree. 
Evidence suggests that research into some types of clean energy 
benefits dirtytech as much as cleantech; innovation snowballing suggests 
disfavoring those types of research. First, cleantech innovations vary in 
terms of their spillovers to dirtytech. In general, there appears to be very 
little cross-pollination between the two: cleantech innovation spillovers 
predominately benefit cleantech technologies and dirtytech innovation 
spillovers predominately benefit dirtytech technologies.156 For example, 
empirical work suggests that individual clean energy technologies are not 
built on a common stock of cleantech knowledge, but rather on 
technology-specific knowledge stocks.157 The research finds that more 
than eighty percent of solar patents reference previous solar patents, but 
only two percent cite patents in other renewable energy technologies, such 
 
 
156.  NOAILLY & SHESTALOVA, supra note 129, at 23 tbl.A1 (showing that, with the exception of 
waste and biomass, fewer than ten percent of renewable energy patents are cited in fossil fuel patents). 
157.  NOAILLY & SHESTALOVA, supra note 93, at 1 (showing through an empirical analysis of 
patent citations that “renewable technology mainly builds on its own technology-specific knowledge 
stock”). 
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as wind, storage, and hydroelectric.158 Innovations in wind therefore 
appear to contribute very little to the development of solar. Or, stated 
differently, solar innovators stand largely on the shoulders of past solar 
innovators, rather than on the shoulders of past renewable energy 
innovators. This is not to say that there are no meaningful innovation 
synergies between renewable energy technologies. About ten percent of 
wind patents, for example, cite innovations in other (non-wind) 
renewables, while a quarter of patents in marine technologies (which 
include tidal, wave, and underwater power generators) reference 
innovations in wind and hydropower.159 However, for most renewable 
technologies, intra-technology spillovers dominate inter-technology 
spillovers from other forms of cleantech.160 
But other apparently cleantech technologies do as much or more to 
build up the dirtytech knowledge stock than the cleantech knowledge 
stock. For example, knowledge from advancements in waste and biomass 
technologies flows primarily to fossil-fuel technologies, such as coal, 
engines, and gas turbines.161 The technologies are, after all, fundamentally 
about combusting materials that resemble fossil fuels. At the same time, 
intra-technology spillovers—as well as spillovers to other renewables—
are quite small for both waste and biomass.162 As a result, subsidizing 
these two “clean” technologies may have the perverse effect of widening 
the knowledge gap between cleantech and dirtytech, and the logic of 
innovation snowballing suggests disfavoring biomass in favor of wind and 
solar. 
A second category of innovations makes dirtytech cleaner; innovation 
snowballing again—by the same logic—suggests disfavoring these 
technologies relative to purely cleantech technologies. For example, many 
technologies make the internal combustion engine more efficient, reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions for each unit of energy produced. Similarly, 
carbon capture and sequestration promises to reduce the greenhouse gas 
emissions of fossil fuel technologies by storing some of the emissions 
underground. These technologies build upon the traditional dirtytech 
infrastructure of burning fossil fuels, thereby potentially delaying the point 
at which overall clean technologies become cheaper than dirty ones. The 
logic of innovation snowballing argues against subsidizing such 
 
 
158.  Id. at 12 tbl.4.1. 
159.  Id. 
160.  Id. 
161.  Noailly & Shestalova, supra note 129, at 17 (finding that “[t]here are many interactions 
between the waste and biomass and the [fossil fuel] technologies knowledge bases”). 
162.  Id. at 15 tbl.5 (reporting statistically insignificant coefficients on the variables for intra-
technology and inter-renewable technologies spillovers for the waste and biomass regressions). 
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technologies. While this Article cannot resolve the difficult technical 
question of which areas are most likely to succeed in achieving a low-
greenhouse-gas future (e.g., rooftop solar versus utility-scale solar versus 
offshore wind versus onshore wind), it does weigh in favor of technologies 
that are more similar to other clean technologies. 
Just as the market provides relatively little guidance on how to promote 
cleantech over dirtytech, it also provides little guidance on how to choose 
within cleantech. For example, market signals would not indicate that 
biomass innovations spill over to dirtytech, thereby impeding efforts to 
close the cleantech-dirtytech gap. Similarly, market signals would not 
indicate which cleantech technology has the greatest intra-technology 
spillovers—a piece of information that could be useful to budget-
constrained policymakers, since technologies with larger intra-technology 
spillovers may, as a result, also require less subsidization. These 
considerations reduce the value of market-based innovation tools, while 
increasing the usefulness of government-set rewards that can incorporate 
this non-market information. 
Making this limited case for choosing within cleantech is eased 
somewhat by the practical reality of implementing government grants and 
prizes. In the case of research grants, the government must pick winners 
with each project, thereby necessarily choosing one specific technology 
over another. Of course, the overall portfolio of grants may seek to be 
technology-neutral, but in practice the decision-making process typically 
requires choosing particular technologies. For example, according to the 
recently-passed 21st Century Cures Act, which includes prizes for 
innovation in healthcare, experts will pick particular projects.163 One might 
try to imagine the most technology-neutral prize possible—e.g., a prize to 
the first person who produces energy with no more than x units of carbon 
at y cost per unit of energy. In practice though, prizes are likely to be 
technology specific: e.g., competitions for battery, wind, or solar design. 
Indeed, setting broad targets for climate prizes may perversely increase the 
subjectivity in judging the winner, something that many supporters of 
prizes seek to avoid.164 And even scholars who have been critical of the 
government’s role in picking winners have proposed climate prizes that 
target certain technologies and certain sectors.165 Notably, in all of these 
 
 
163.  JUDITH A. JOHNSON ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44071, H.R. 6: THE 21ST CENTURY 
CURES ACT (2015) (describing the prize provision). 
164.  See, e.g., Richard G. Newell & Nathan E. Wilson, Technology Prizes for Climate Change 
Mitigation 27 (Res. for the Future, Discussion Paper No. RFF DP 05-33, 2005). 
165.  Adler, supra note 9, at 43 (proposing that the federal government creates climate prizes for 
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cases, it is experts and not Congress that make the decisions, which could 
ease concerns about the influence of lobbying. In short, by arguing for the 
government to pick cleantech over dirtytech and, in some cases, certain 
cleantech types over others, we are not proposing something that is 
procedurally different from what is already done. The government already 
has wide experience in picking winners project-by-project. Of course, the 
strongest critics of grants and prizes may ultimately decide that the 
downsides of those tools outweigh the benefits of addressing innovation 
snowballing. For them, an R&D tax credit targeted at cleantech—
discussed in the next subsection—may be a desirable alternative for 
addressing innovation snowballing. 
c. R&D Tax Credits vs. Patents 
Thus far, we have focused on the relative merits of patents and 
government-set rewards, arguing that innovation snowballing increases the 
relative attractiveness of grants and prizes. But we have also recognized 
the risks of government-set innovation subsidies—and therefore the value 
of market-set policy tools. As a result, it is worthwhile to explore the 
implications of innovation snowballing for the two main types of market-
set innovation instruments: patents and R&D tax credits.166 We show in 
this subsection that innovation snowballing does not favor all market-set 
innovation rewards equally. Instead, it increases the value of R&D tax 
credits relative to patents. 
R&D tax credits do not face the same problems of monopolization that 
plague the patent system.167 Consider, for example, a cleantech R&D tax 
credit that subsidizes cleantech research expenditures above and beyond 
the support provided under the existing general R&D tax credit. By 
increasing the expected returns to cleantech R&D, such a credit could 
 
 
technologies ranging from “vehicle and building design to fuel cell technology, agricultural methods, 
and carbon sequestration technologies”). 
166.  Others have considered the merits of encouraging innovation through taxes. See generally 
Jacob Nussim & Anat Sorek, Theorizing Tax Incentives for Innovation, 36 VA. TAX REV. 25 (2017) 
(arguing against using taxes and explaining why non-tax incentives are most likely superior, on the 
basis of organizational theory); Shaun P. Mahaffy, Note, The Case for Tax: A Comparative Approach 
to Innovation Policy, 123 YALE L.J. 812, 812 (2013) (suggesting that “tax credits could be used to 
ameliorate a number of inefficiencies that arise from the failures of patent law.”).  
167.  R&D tax credits as currently constituted in the U.S. face the problem of non-refundability. 
That is, to receive the credit, innovators generally need to have enough profits from which to deduct 
the credit. Small entrepreneurs often do not have such profits and are therefore unable to benefit from 
the credit. See Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 6, at 337. (But see I.R.C. § 41(h) (2017) (allowing 
limited refundability for small businesses).) Of course, for small entrepreneurs, patents cause problems 
too: if a business is liquidity-constrained, it may not have enough money to survive long enough to be 
able to patent its invention and reap the rewards.  
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induce greater cleantech innovation. In contrast to patents, however, a 
cleantech R&D tax credit would not increase the costs of future cleantech 
innovations because the credit confers a government subsidy, not 
monopoly rights, to the inventor. As discussed earlier, monopolization 
hinders innovators’ ability to stand on the shoulders of past cleantech 
entrepreneurs. The advantages of a cleantech R&D tax credit remain even 
if the credit is layered on top of the existing patent system.168 Holding 
patent protection levels constant, an increase in R&D tax credits for 
cleantech increases the expected returns to cleantech innovation.169 So 
creation of a cleantech credit would unambiguously work to close the 
cleantech-dirtytech knowledge gap. 
Admittedly, a cleantech R&D tax credit would require the Internal 
Revenue Service to do a lot of line drawing with respect to which 
expenses qualify as cleantech R&D. And businesses would try to game the 
system. Indeed, some tax scholars argue that rampant gaming already 
exists in the current system of R&D tax credits, although many economists 
believe that these credits are effective at encouraging innovation.170 But 
attempts to use patents to address innovation snowballing would face 
similar challenges: designing a patent system that provided extra rewards 
to cleantech would also raise thorny definitional issues and gaming 
concerns. R&D tax credits, however, hold clear advantages over patents in 
the context of innovation snowballing. In addition to avoiding the 
problems of monopolization that characterize the patent system, a 
cleantech R&D tax credit more closely aligns with the beneficiaries pay 
principle. As discussed above, spurring cleantech innovation and closing 
the cleantech-dirtytech gap confers global benefits, as they both reduce the 
 
 
168.  Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Patent Experimentalism, 101 VA. L. REV. 65, 93 (2015) (briefly 
discussing the interaction between patents and tax credits); Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 6, at 327–
28 (for a longer discussion of this overlay). 
169.  At least in principle, R&D tax credits can prohibit monopolization. For instance, 
policymakers could design a cleantech R&D tax credit such that companies that relied on it would not 
be allowed to patent the resulting technology. Such a move, of course, would raise a whole host of 
logistical complications that are beyond the scope of this Article. However, it is worth noting that 
replacing patent protections with a sufficiently large cleantech R&D tax credit could, in theory, 
preserve the incentives for cleantech innovation without slowing the long-term growth of the cleantech 
knowledge stock. In any case, as noted in the text, such a prohibition is not needed for an R&D tax 
credit to encourage innovation. 
170.  Compare Stephen E. Shay et al., R&D Tax Incentives: Growth Panacea or Budget Trojan 
Horse?, 69 TAX L. REV. 419, 419–26 (2016) (expressing strong skepticism regarding the effectiveness 
of the current R&D tax credit system), with Nirupama Rao, Do Tax Credits Stimulate R&D Spending? 
The Effect of the R&D Tax Credit in Its First Decade, 140 J. PUB. ECON. 1, 1 (2016) (finding strong 
empirical evidence that U.S. federal R&D tax credit increased firm R&D activity in both the short- and 
long-run). 
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negative externality of carbon pollution and make climate-change 
mitigation cheaper. Patents, in contrast, concentrate the costs of cleantech 
innovation on a small subset of beneficiaries, namely: large energy users 
and future cleantech innovators. A cleantech R&D tax credit, on the other 
hand, could be funded through a general tax on the population that spreads 
the costs of cleantech innovation broadly. 
This is not to say, of course, that policymakers cannot or should not 
promote cleantech innovation through modifications to the patent system. 
Lisa Larrimore Ouellette has argued, for example, that the Bayh-Dole 
Act171 impedes green innovation by allowing scientists and universities to 
patent technologies developed with federal research grants.172 While 
supporters of the Act claim that public patents are needed to incentivize 
commercialization of federally funded technologies, Ouellette and others 
counter that these commercialization hurdles are small for green 
technologies.173 If these critics of the Bayh-Dole Act are correct, then 
policymakers could increase the cleantech knowledge stock by making 
nonexclusive licensing the default or prohibiting patents for publicly 
funded cleantech innovations. 
Similarly, if one believes that overpatenting is a problem in the context 
of cleantech, several other legal options suggested by Mark Lemley could 
be adopted.174 First, there could be a stricter “utility” requirement in the 
case of cleantech, like the one that exists in chemistry and 
biotechnology.175 That is, those seeking patents in cleantech would have to 
show a higher threshold of usefulness in order to achieve the patent.176 
Second, courts or Congress could limit injunctive relief in cleantech patent 
infringement cases, instead limiting remedies to a reasonable royalty.177 
They could particularly do so where a patent infringes upon only a small 
part of a product.178 Doing so would make it more difficult for 
 
 
171.  35 U.S.C. § 203(a) (2012). 
172.  See Ouellette, supra note 150, at 1737–38.  
173.  Id. at 174. 
174.  Mark Lemley, Patenting Nanotechnology, 58 STAN. L. REV. 601, 628–30 (2005). 
175.  See, e.g., In re Kirk, 376 F.2d 936, 961 (C.C.P.A. 1967) (Rich, J., dissenting) (arguing that 
such a utility requirement would not be applied elsewhere); David S. Almeling, Note, Patenting 
Nanotechnology: Problems with the Utility Requirement, 2004 STAN. TECH. L. REV. N1 (2004) 
(making the descriptive argument that courts have applied the utility requirement “with more force” in 
the context of chemistry and biotechnology patents). 
176.  Cf. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (making patentability contingent on the invention being 
“useful”). See also Dmitry Karshtedt, The Completeness Requirement in Patent Law, 56 B.C. L. REV. 
949, 972–74 (2015) (describing the current threshold of usefulness for patentability). 
177.  See Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEX. L. REV. 
1991, 1993 (2007) (explaining how patent holders can use the threat of an injunction to “negotiate 
royalties far in excess of the patent holder’s true economic contribution.”).  
178.  See, e.g., Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 177, at 1993 (showing that the problem is especially 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol95/iss2/7
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patentholders to “hold up” those who wish to build upon existing 
patents.179 Third, the law could further limit holdup by curtailing the 
ability of patent-holders to seek treble damages against infringers in the 
context of cleantech.180 Fourth, limiting the ability to keep some patent 
applications secret could also promote shoulder-standing in cleantech.181 
Finally, disallowing patents on upstream “enabling technologies” might 
help catalyze innovation snowballs. As discussed above, the profitability 
of innovating on a particular innovation stock increases with the size of 
the stock. Thus, for nascent technologies with small knowledge stocks, 
even small costs to innovation can stop an innovation snowball in its 
tracks, so the costs of patents might be sufficient to strangle a young 
innovation snowball before it has time to grow and gain momentum.182 In 
contrast, as the technology matures, its knowledge stock grows, and its 
profitability increases, the innovation snowball gains “mass” and 
“momentum” and can therefore more easily overcome costs to innovation. 
These dynamics argue against allowing inventors to patent the initial, 
foundational building blocks of a technology stock, thereby increasing the 
transaction costs for future inventors. 
Of course, any of the above patent proposals could have ambiguous 
impacts on innovation: encouraging the use of existing cleantech 
technology, but also discouraging its production in the first place by 
reducing the amount that patent-holders can recover in court. Moreover, 
pushing cleantech over the technology tipping point will require major 
increases in the incentives for cleantech innovation—and, especially given 
the ambiguous impacts of these changes, we are skeptical that these 
marginal changes to the patent system alone can provide the necessary 
stimulus. Instead, if policymakers are looking to address innovation 
snowballing while minimizing government’s role in dispersing innovation 
subsidies, they may want to simultaneously create a cleantech R&D tax 
 
 
acute where “the injunction is based on a patent covering one small component of a complex, 
profitable, and popular product.”). 
179.  See Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 177, at 2009. 
180.  See Mark A. Lemley & Ragesh K. Tangri, Ending Patent Law’s Willfulness Game, 18 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1085, 1109–13 (2003); Mark A. Lemley, Ten Things to Do About Patent 
Holdup of Standards (And One Not to Do), 48 B.C. L. REV. 149, 164 (2007) (proposing modifications 
to the willfulness standard in patent law to reduce the risk of liability for treble damages and thereby 
mitigate some of the holdup problems). 
181.  Cf. 35 U.S.C. § 122(b)(1)(B) (in general, “[n]o information concerning published patent 
applications shall be made available to the public”). 
182.  Indeed, it is suggestive that, for many of the breakthrough technology fields of the past 
century, such as computers and the Internet, early inventors did not patent their initial inventions and 
discoveries. See Lemley, supra note 174, at 606. 
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credit and weaken existing patent protections for cleantech. In theory, any 
loss of innovation incentives resulting from less patent protection could be 
offset by more generous tax credits. However, weaker patent protections 
will make it unambiguously cheaper for future innovators to build on the 
existing cleantech knowledge stock. 
B. Non-Innovation Policy 
While a first-best climate innovation policy would partner a carbon tax 
with increases in financial support for cleantech R&D, optimal 
policymaking is rarely an option in a world with political constraints. 
Thus, it is also worth considering the implications of innovation 
snowballing for second-best approaches to cleantech innovation. This 
subsection examines four general policies: (1) performance standards; (2) 
deployment subsidies; (3) government procurement; and (4) infrastructure 
choices. Since governments already deploy these tools in the energy space, 
they provide opportunities to align climate policy with the implications of 
innovation snowballing. 
1. Performance Standards 
To reduce pollution levels, U.S. policymakers have often relied on 
performance standards that specify the environmental performance of a 
regulated entity. As discussed in Part I, performance standards have a 
recognized secondary objective of promoting innovation in abatement 
technologies.183 While scholars have debated whether performance 
standards or market-based approaches are more effective at inducing 
innovation,184 there is strong evidence that at least some performance 
standards have incentivized technological advancements in the past.185 
Even so, few economists believe that even successful performance 
 
 
183.  Stewart, supra note 9, at 1296 (describing how existing command-and-control regulatory 
programs “have fallen far short of ambitious technology-forcing goals.”); La Pierre, supra note 51, at 
771 (characterizing “spurring the technological changes necessary to reduce pollution levels” as one of 
the main tasks that Congress attempted to accomplish through environmental legislation during the 
1970s).  
184.  Compare Ayres & Kapczynski, supra note 21, at 1817 (arguing that performance standards 
can serve as “innovation sticks” and pointing to CAFE standards as a successful example of a 
technology-forcing standard), with Sunstein, supra note 9, at 420 (arguing that best adequate 
technology standards under the Clean Air Act perversely discourage innovation). See also Popp, supra 
note 43, at 283–84 (reviewing recent research that has complicated the perceived comparative 
effectiveness of market-based policies and command-and-control regimes at incentivizing innovation 
in pollution mitigation technologies). 
185.  See Ayres & Kapczynski, supra note 21, at 1815–17 (reviewing the literature on the effects 
of CAFE standards on vehicular innovation).  
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standards are part of the optimal solution to pollution; instead, a pollution 
tax is the preferred tool. Nevertheless, these standards persist, making it 
worthwhile to consider how innovation snowballing affects their 
desirability and specifically how these spillovers raise concerns about 
dirtytech lock-in. 
Some technology-forcing performance standards have driven 
environmentally beneficial technological development. For example, the 
Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) Standard is arguably a climate 
success story for its impact on greenhouse gas emissions.186 This 
performance standard substantially raised the fuel efficiency of American 
vehicles since its inception in 1975,187 and stricter standards for 2025 
promise to reduce carbon output from the transportation sector by six 
billion metric tons.188 
Innovation snowballing, however, raises concerns about the use of 
performance standards like CAFE. To date, CAFE has worked to build up 
the knowledge stock of fossil-fuel vehicles. But many argue that climate 
stability requires a major shift away from the internal combustion engine 
and towards zero-emission cars like electric plug-in and fuel cell 
vehicles.189 If so, then CAFE standards may perversely undermine climate 
efforts to the extent that they direct innovation away from zero-emission 
cars and toward improving the fuel efficiency of fossil-fuel vehicles. In 
particular, if automakers believe they can more cost-effectively meet 
federal fuel-economy requirements by improving the efficiency of their 
 
 
186.  See id.; Virginia McConnell, The New CAFE Standards: Are They Enough on Their Own? 1 
(Res. for the Future, Discussion Paper No. 13-14, 2013) (observing that “the early CAFE requirements 
are considered a success by many”); COMM. ON THE EFFECTIVENESS & IMPACT OF CORP. AVERAGE 
FUEL ECON. (CAFE) STANDARDS, EFFECTIVENESS AND IMPACT OF CORPORATE AVERAGE FUEL 
ECONOMY (CAFE) STANDARDS 3 (2002) (concluding that “[t]he CAFE program has clearly 
contributed to increased fuel economy of the nation’s light-duty vehicle fleet during the past 22 
years.”). 
187.  Fairly ambitious fuel economy standards in the 1970s and 1980s, for example, helped double 
the mileage of passenger cars and increase the fuel economy of light trucks by fifty percent. Id. at 14. 
While some of these efficiency gains came from reducing vehicle size, others have been attributed to 
technological advancements in fuel efficiency. Id. 
188.  For a review of the effects of earlier CAFE standards on emission levels, see id. at 20 
(calculating that “improvements in light-duty vehicle fuel economy have reduced overall U.S. 
emissions by about 7 percent”).  
189.  See, e.g., JAMES H. WILLIAMS ET AL., ENERGY & ENVTL. ECON. (E3), PATHWAYS TO DEEP 
DECARBONIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES (2015), http://deepdecarbonization.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/11/US_Deep_Decarbonization_Technical_Report_Exec_Summary.pdf 
(concluding that meeting 2050 climate-stabilization targets requires a massive shift to electric 
vehicles); James H. Williams et al., The Technology Path to Deep Greenhouse Gas Emissions Cuts by 
2050: The Pivotal Role of Electricity, 335 SCI. 53, 53 (2012) (finding that “widespread electrification 
of transportation and other sectors is required” to “meet California’s goal of an 80% reduction below 
1990 levels” by 2050). 
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gasoline-powered vehicles rather than by increasing the share of zero-
emission vehicles in their fleet, the innovation gap between zero-emission 
vehicles and fossil-fuel cars will increase.190 
Similarly, innovation snowballing raises some concerns about the 
design of the Clean Power Plan, President Obama’s signature climate 
change initiative.191 According to projections made by the U.S. Energy 
Information Agency, this performance standard for the electricity grid 
would not only boost wind and solar production, but also lead to sizeable 
increases in electricity produced by natural gas.192 Given path dependency, 
this expansion in natural gas could be problematic, as natural gas 
proponents and opponents alike view the resource as a temporary “bridge” 
to the zero-emission energy system of the future.193 Regulations that 
induce natural gas production, however, may unintentionally widen the 
knowledge gap between natural gas and cleantech, making it ultimately 
harder to later transition to wind and solar.194 
This analysis suggests that the design of the performance standard is 
 
 
190.  Notably, concerns about path dependency in automotive innovation are not merely 
theoretical in nature. As discussed earlier, careful empirical work has shown that dirty (clean) 
automotive innovations are strongly linked to a firm’s past innovations in dirty (clean) car 
technologies. See Aghion et al., supra note 15, at 1. 
191.  Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility 
Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,662 (Oct. 23, 2015) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60). 
192.  LAURA MARTIN & JEFFREY JONES, ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., REP. NO. DOE/EIA-0383, 
ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2016 WITH PROJECTIONS TO 2040 (2016), 
https://cepl.gatech.edu/sites/default/files/attachments/AEO2016.  
193.  Compare STEPHEN P.A. BROWN, ALAN J. KRUPNICK & MARGARET A. WALLS, RES. FOR 
THE FUTURE, NATURAL GAS: IS IT A BRIDGE TO A LOW-CARBON FUTURE? 2 (2009) (expressing 
optimism that natural gas can play a useful role as “a bridge fuel to a low-carbon future”), with 
Parenteau & Barnes, supra note 13, at 328 (recognizing natural gas’ environmental advantages over 
coal, but warning of the risks of natural gas’ long-term entrenchment in the U.S. energy system). 
194.  Importantly, although the Clean Power Plan would likely benefit natural gas, regulators took 
a number of steps to protect against the risk of natural gas lock-in. First, EPA closed a loophole in the 
proposed rule that would have allowed states to replace coal-fired power plants with newly constructed 
natural gas plants that would not be covered by the Clean Power Plan. Second, the rule limits the 
extent to which shifts from existing coal to existing natural gas can count for compliance purposes. 
And third, the Clean Power Plan created the Clean Energy Incentive Program, a voluntary mechanism 
that incentivizes states to invest in wind, solar, and energy efficiency resources in the near term. See 
generally Rachel Cleetus, Four Ways the Final Clean Power Plan Limits the Rush to Natural Gas, 
UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS (Aug. 7, 2015, 3:46 PM), http://blog.ucsusa.org/rachel-
cleetus/four-ways-the-final-clean-power-plan-limits-the-rush-to-natural-gas. Specifically, renewable 
energy projects developed prior to the official roll-out of the Clean Power Plan receive extra emission 
credits, which they can then sell when the regulation’s carbon markets come online. Thus, while the 
first two modifications to the Clean Power Plan work to prevent a “dash to gas” and a subsequent 
widening of the gas-renewable knowledge gap, the Clean Energy Incentive Program proactively closes 
the knowledge gap by directing investors and innovators towards specified emission-free technologies. 
See id.; DALLAS BURTRAW ET AL., RES. FOR THE FUTURE, APPROACHES TO ADDRESS POTENTIAL CO2 
EMISSIONS LEAKAGE TO NEW SOURCES UNDER THE CLEAN POWER PLAN (2016), 
http://www.rff.org/files/document/file/RFF-Rpt-CPPCommentstoEPA160121_1.pdf. 
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important to its effectiveness at building the cleantech knowledge stock. 
Not all performance standards that reduce emissions close the cleantech-
dirtytech innovation gap. It also suggests that other tools may be worthy of 
consideration, like state renewable portfolio standards that specifically 
require cleantech energy sources, which evidence suggests have increased 
innovation in wind and solar technologies.195 In short, policymakers 
should not automatically equate emissions reductions with the closing of 
the cleantech-dirtytech knowledge gap. While policymakers can design 
performance standards to simultaneously lower pollution levels and 
redirect innovation towards cleantech, a myopic focus on near-term 
emissions reductions may unintentionally hinder the growth of cleantech 
innovation—and ultimately hinder emissions reductions—in the long 
term. In this way, too little attention to the long-term dynamics of 
innovation can produce counter-productive results. 
2. Deployment Subsidies 
Broadly speaking, deployment subsidies directly reward the adoption 
of, rather than research into, a particular technology. Prominent examples 
include the Production Tax Credit for wind and the Investment Tax Credit 
for solar.196 Green finance models—such as Property Assessed Clean 
Energy programs, loan guarantees from state Green Banks, and on-bill 
energy efficiency financing mechanisms—also fall under the heading of 
deployment subsidies, as these programs reduce the costs of building or 
adopting cleantech.197 According to the conventional policy analysis view, 
such subsidies are poor uses of taxpayer dollars, since the externalities 
(either positive for innovation or negative for pollution) should instead be 
targeted directly.198 If the positive spillovers come from R&D, not 
 
 
195.  See Nathaniel Horner et al., Effects of Government Incentives on Wind Innovation in the 
United States, 8 ENVTL. RES. LETTERS 1, 1 (2013) (finding that renewable portfolio standards had a 
positive effect on U.S. wind innovation, as measured by patenting activity). 
196.  26 U.S.C. § 48 (2012) (investment tax credit); 26 U.S.C. § 45 (2012) (production tax credit). 
See Dan Reicher, Setting the Climate Agenda for the Next President: Toward a More Effective Federal 
Clean Energy Toolkit 6 (Stan. Climate Implementation Project, Discussion Paper, 2016) (describing 
how federal tax credits have functioned as “key federal tools in incentivizing large-scale deployment 
of clean energy technologies” in the United States). 
197.  See Richard L. Ottinger & John Bowie, Innovative Financing for Renewable Energy, 32 
PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 701, 701 (2015) (discussing successful new finance mechanisms for renewable 
energy sources). See also generally Michael B. Gerrard, Introduction and Overview, in THE LAW OF 
CLEAN ENERGY: ENERGY EFFICIENCY AND RENEWABLES (Michael B. Gerrard ed., 2011) (reviewing 
innovative finance mechanisms for renewables and energy efficiency resources). 
198.  See e.g., COMM. ON THE EFFECTS OF PROVISIONS IN THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE ON 
GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS ET AL., EFFECTS OF U.S. TAX POLICY ON GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS 
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deployment, then the most efficient way of encouraging the spillovers is 
directly targeting the R&D, since the impact of deployment subsidies is 
split between inducing R&D and encouraging the adoption of existing 
technology. We do not take a stand on whether they are good or bad 
policy, but we offer a qualified defense that they are better policy than 
generally believed in light of innovation snowballing. 
Innovation spillovers alone might justify government use of 
deployment subsidies. The existence of learning-by-using externalities 
would lead to suboptimal adoption rates and diffusion rates of emergent 
clean technologies, such as wind and solar, if the externalities are 
particularly large for these technologies.199 Innovation snowballing, 
however, further strengthens the case for deployment subsidies, as these 
policy instruments increase the knowledge stock of cleantech. Specifically, 
because deployment subsidies make cleantech more profitable, they have 
the indirect effect of making cleantech R&D more profitable. As a result, 
deployment subsidies can help direct innovation flows (including 
scientists and capital) away from dirtytech and towards cleantech. And, 
indeed, emerging empirical work suggests that cleantech deployment 
subsidies, including investment incentives and feed-in tariffs (in which 
governments guarantee a certain payment to energy producers), have 
significantly increased cleantech innovation, although innovation-inducing 
effects appear to vary across subsidy policies and types of clean energy 
technology.200 These findings make intuitive sense: just like a price shock 
to oil prices or a carbon tax induces cleantech innovation by changing the 
relative prices of producing cleantech and dirtytech, a deployment subsidy 
similarly alters relative prices by bringing down the price of cleantech.201 
In this way, cleantech deployment subsidies do more than reducing 
 
 
10 (William D. Nordhaus et al., eds. 2013) (concluding that “current tax expenditures and subsidies are 
a poor tool for reducing greenhouse gases and achieving climate-change objectives”). 
199.  See Gillingham & Sweeney, supra note 30, at 86–87 (discussing how government might 
intervene to addressing learning-by-doing, learning-by-using, and network externalities). 
200.  See, e.g., Nick Johnstone, Ivan Hascic & David Popp, Renewable Energy Policies and 
Technological Innovation: Evidence Based on Patent Counts, 45 ENVTL. & RES. ECON. 133, 133 
(2010). It should also be stressed that this empirical literature is still in its infancy. For example, extant 
research has produced mixed conclusions about the innovation effects of the U.S. wind tax credits. 
Compare EILEEN HLAVKA, POLICY IMPACTS ON WIND AND SOLAR INNOVATION (RAND 2013) 
(finding tax credits had positive impact on number of relevant academic journal articles published per 
month), with Horner et al., supra note 195, at 1 (finding that tax credits have not increased patenting 
activity among wind technologies).  
201.  Newell, Jaffe & Stavins, supra note 71, at 971 (showing that oil price spikes biased 
innovation in air conditioning toward producing more energy efficient units); Popp, supra note 19, at 
160 (demonstrating that higher energy prices directed innovation toward energy-saving inventions); 
Aghion et al., supra note 15, at 3 (finding that higher fuel prices direct innovation toward cleaner 
forms of automobile innovation). 
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greenhouse gas emissions in the near term; they also promise to build up 
the cleantech innovation stock over the long term. 
In addition to highlighting the underappreciated benefits of cleantech 
deployment subsidies, innovation snowballing also exacerbates the 
irrationality of existing fossil fuel subsidies. Globally, fossil fuels receive 
hundreds of billions of dollars in government subsidization each year.202 
Factoring in the “subsidy” that fossil fuel producers receive from not 
having a price on carbon raises this annual total into the trillions.203 
Subsidization of fossil fuels far outstrips support for clean energy: indeed, 
global consumption subsidies alone are more than four times greater for 
fossil fuels than for renewable energy resources.204 This allocation of 
subsidies not only leads to increased greenhouse gas emissions in the short 
run but also widens the cleantech-dirtytech knowledge gap, with long-
lasting effects on innovation.205 
3. Government Procurement 
As with deployment subsidies, innovation snowballing increases the 
attractiveness of government procurement of cleantech. Those 
expenditures function like cleantech deployment subsidies in that they 
increase demand for cleantech, and therefore the profitability of cleantech 
R&D.206 Moreover, governments wield substantial purchasing power that 
could shift market outcomes in favor of cleantech. In the United States, for 
example, the federal government is the single largest consumer of energy 
and vehicles,207 and federal agencies manage a little less than a third of all 
 
 
202.  Comparison of Fossil-Fuel Subsidy and Support Estimates, INT’L INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE 
DEV., https://www.iisd.org/gsi/sites/default/files/ffs_methods_estimationcomparison.pdf (last visited 
July 28, 2017) (summarizing estimates from various studies).  
203.  David Coady et al., How Large Are Global Energy Subsidies? 29 (Int’l Monetary Fund, 
Working Paper No. WP/15/105, 2015) (estimating that post-tax subsidies for petroleum alone to be 
about $1.6 trillion in 2013). 
204.  Energy Subsidies, WORLD ENERGY OUTLOOK, http://www.worldenergyoutlook.org/reso 
urces/energysubsidies/ (last visited July 28, 2016). 
205.  In 2009, members of the G20 pledged to phase out inefficient fossil fuel subsidies. They 
have yet, however, to fulfill this promise. Alison Kirsch & Timmons Roberts, Ghosts of Resolutions 
Past: The G20 Agreement on Phasing out Inefficient Fossil Fuel Subsidies, BROOKINGS: 
PLANETPOLICY (Nov. 14, 2014), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/planetpolicy/2014/11/14/ghosts-of-
resolutions-past-the-g20-agreement-on-phasing-out-inefficient-fossil-fuel-subsidies/. 
206.  See Amy L. Stein, Renewable Energy Through Agency Action, 84 U. COLO. L. REV. 651, 
688–92 (2013).  
207.  U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO 17–43, INDIAN ENERGY DEVELOPMENT: 
ADDITIONAL ACTIONS BY FEDERAL AGENCIES ARE NEEDED TO OVERCOME FACTORS HINDERING 
DEVELOPMENT (2016) (observing that “the federal government [is] the largest single consumer of 
energy in the nation”); COMM. ON OVERCOMING BARRIERS TO ELECTRIC VEHICLE DEPLOYMENT ET 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
446 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 95:387 
 
 
 
U.S. land.208 The Department of Defense alone owns more than 200,000 
buildings, operates about 200,000 non-tactical vehicles, and has an annual 
electricity bill of roughly $4 billion.209 And there are many ways in which 
the government could expand its procurement for cleantech. For instance, 
electric vehicles currently constitute about one percent of the U.S. federal 
government’s fleet.210 Electrifying the entire fleet, however, would more 
than double the number of zero-emission vehicles currently on the 
roads.211 The government could similarly expand demand for clean 
electricity technologies by increasing its share of electricity from 
renewable power sources, which currently stands at about eight percent,212 
or by making it easier for wind and solar developers to build on the 
roughly 640 million acres of federal lands.213 
To be sure, there are tradeoffs and constraints to redirecting 
government procurement towards cleantech. Governments have a duty to 
spend taxpayer dollars wisely, and agencies may balk at having to pay a 
premium for cleantech.214 Moreover, “going green” can, in some cases, 
result in unacceptable losses of government functionality. For instance, 
with the current state of technology, electrifying certain types of military 
vehicles may not be feasible.215 In making these calculations, however, 
innovation snowballing should be considered, as the government’s vast 
consumer purchasing power makes it uniquely situated to subsidize 
cleantech innovation and help close the cleantech-dirtytech innovation 
gap. 
 
 
AL., OVERCOMING BARRIERS TO DEPLOYMENT OF PLUG-IN ELECTRIC VEHICLES 59 (2015). 
208.  CAROL HARDY VINCENT ET AL., CONG. RES. SERV., R42346, FEDERAL LAND OWNERSHIP: 
OVERVIEW AND DATA 3 (2014) (estimating that the government owns about twenty-eight percent of 
the 2.27 billion acres of land in the United States). 
209.  See Stein, supra note 206, at 697.  
210.  See COMM. ON OVERCOMING BARRIERS TO ELECTRIC VEHICLE DEPLOYMENT ET AL., supra 
note 207, at 60 (noting that even the Department of Energy’s vehicle fleet is only 0.73 percent 
electric).  
211.  The size of the federal government’s non-tactical fleet has been estimated at about 400,000 
vehicles. See Reicher, supra note 196, at 21. In 2014, cumulative sales of electric vehicles in the 
United States came in under 300,000 vehicles. See generally DAVID BLOCK ET AL., ELEC. VEHICLE 
TRANSP. CTR., ELECTRIC VEHICLE SALES FOR 2014 AND FUTURE PROJECTIONS (2015).  
212.  In 2015, approximately 8.3 percent of electricity used by the federal government came from 
renewables. Comprehensive Annual Energy Data and Sustainability Performance, U.S. DEP’T OF 
ENERGY, http://ctsedwweb.ee.doe.gov/Annual/Report/FederalAgencyUseRenewableElectricAsPerce 
ntageOfElectricityUse.aspx (last visited on July 28, 2017). 
213.  VINCENT ET AL., supra note 208. 
214.  See Stein, supra note 206, at 655 (raising these same concerns). 
215.  For a discussion of the Department of Defense’s efforts to integrate renewables into their 
energy supply, see generally PEW CHARITABLE TRS., POWER SURGE: HOW THE DEPARTMENT OF 
DEFENSE LEVERAGES PRIVATE RESOURCES TO ENHANCE ENERGY SECURITY AND SAVE MONEY ON 
U.S. MILITARY BASES (2014), http://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/legacy/uploadedfiles/peg/publication 
s/report/pewdodreport2013ks10020314pdf.pdf. 
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4. Infrastructure 
Finally, government infrastructure spending can also significantly 
influence the direction of technological change. For instance, the interstate 
highway system—the largest public works project undertaken by the U.S. 
government to date—has played a pivotal role in orienting the 
transportation sector away from mass transit and towards the personal 
automobile.216 More recently, environmentalists have raised concerns 
about permitting the construction of new oil and natural gas pipelines, 
such as Keystone XL and the Dakota Access pipelines.217 Although these 
projects would be built using private, rather than taxpayer, dollars, 
environmentalists and others have argued that approving such 
infrastructure entrenches and encourages fossil fuel growth.218 Given that 
pipelines last for decades,219 these fears of capital lock-in are not 
unfounded. 
Innovation snowballing adds a new dimension to these infrastructure 
decisions by raising the specter of not only physical capital lock-in but 
also innovation lock-in.220 As with the transportation sector, innovation in 
energy technologies are often shaped by the physical infrastructure of the 
energy system.221 For example, Thomas Edison wired his original electric 
 
 
216.  TRANSP. RESEARCH BD., CONSEQUENCES OF THE INTERSTATE HIGHWAY SYSTEM FOR 
TRANSIT: SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 5 (1998), http://onlinepubs.trb.org/onlinepubs/tcrp/tcrp_rpt_42.pdf 
(finding that interstate highway funding biased transportation investments in favor of automobiles and 
against public transit); COMM. ON OVERCOMING BARRIERS TO ELECTRIC VEHICLE DEPLOYMENT ET 
AL., supra note 207, at 1 (observing that, in 1900, nearly a third of passenger cars sold in the United 
States were electric and attributing the decline of the electric vehicle partly to the “development of the 
national highway system, which allowed long-distance travel”). 
217.  See, e.g., Merrit Kennedy, Judge Rules that Construction Can Proceed on Dakota Access 
Pipeline, NPR (Sept. 9, 2016, 3:38 PM), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2016/09/09/493 
280504/judge-rules-that-construction-can-proceed-on-dakota-access-pipeline (describing how the 
Dakota access pipeline has “galvanized Native American tribes and environmentalists across the 
U.S.”); Coral Davenport, Citing Climate Change, Obama Rejects Construction of Keystone XL Oil 
Pipeline, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 6, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/07/us/obama-expected-to-
reject-construction-of-keystone-xl-oil-pipeline.html (describing how the Keystone XL pipeline 
“gained an outsize profile after environmental activists spent four years marching and rallying against 
it”).  
218.  Parenteau & Barnes, supra note 13, at 328. 
219.  Notably, only about a third of existing U.S. gas pipeline infrastructure was built after 1980. 
See James Conca, It Really Is Our Aging Energy Infrastructure, FORBES (May 21, 2015, 6:35 AM) 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/jamesconca/2015/05/21/its-our-aging-energy-infrastructure-stupid/ - 
9a730b47cd38 (citing Department of Energy data for this statistic). 
220.  See REVESZ & LIENKE, supra note 13 (describing capital lock-in). 
221.  Keith Smith, Economic Infrastructures and Innovation Systems, in SYSTEMS OF 
INNOVATION: TECHNOLOGIES, INSTITUTIONS AND ORGANIZATIONS 86, 88 (Charles Edquist ed., 1997) 
(arguing that most complex technologies—including consumer electric, information and 
communication, and aeronautic—have evolved around and been shaped by physical infrastructure). 
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lighting systems using existing networks of gas transmission pipelines, the 
dominant technology at the time.222 More recently, many have argued that 
the physical infrastructure of today’s electricity grid—which was designed 
for connecting large, centralized power sources to faraway population 
centers—has impeded the growth of emergent distributed generation 
technologies.223 Decisions that expand the physical infrastructure that 
undergirds fossil fuel innovation may perversely perpetuate and exacerbate 
the cleantech-dirtytech innovation gap. Thus, in permitting new cleantech 
or dirtytech infrastructure, policymakers should account for the dynamic 
and path-dependent nature of innovation. 
Government can do more than simply limit the extent to which 
infrastructure choices widen the clean-dirty knowledge gap. It can also 
affirmatively promote cleantech innovation through infrastructure 
spending. A prominent example of this proactive approach is former 
President Obama’s initiative to expand and enhance electric vehicle 
fueling infrastructure. In addition to providing $4.5 billion in loan 
guarantees to electric vehicle charging facilities, the Obama 
Administration established forty-eight national electric-vehicle charging 
corridors that span more than thirty states.224 With the help of states, 
utilities, and manufacturers, President Obama established plans to develop 
sufficient charging infrastructure along these corridors to enable coast-to-
coast travel by electric vehicles.225 These efforts will not only spur current 
demand for electric vehicles, but also lay the foundations for future 
innovations in zero-emission transportation technologies. 
 
 
 
222.  Unruh, supra note 68, at 318–19. 
223.  Broadly speaking, distributed generation technologies are smaller-scale energy resources 
owned by electricity consumers, including rooftop solar, combined heat and power, micro turbines, 
energy storage, and demand-side management products. See N.Y. INDEP. SYS. OPERATOR, A REVIEW 
OF DISTRIBUTED ENERGY RESOURCES 1 (2014).  See also ELEC. POWER RESEARCH INST., THE 
INTEGRATED GRID: REALIZING THE FULL VALUE OF CENTRAL AND DISTRIBUTED ENERGY RESOURCES 
3 (2014) (observing that the current grid “was not designed to accommodate a high penetration of 
[distributed energy resources] while sustaining high levels of electric quality and reliability”); Eric 
Gimon, Is the Transmission Grid Ready for Aggregated Distributed Energy Resources?, GREENTECH 
MEDIA (Apr. 6, 2016), https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/is-the-transmission-grid-ready-
for-aggregated-distributed-resources (noting that “[d]istribution utilities must overcome considerable 
physical challenges to enable the participation of distributed resources in the transmission grid”). 
224. Press Release, White House, Obama Administration Announces New Actions To Accelerate 
the Deployment of Electrical Vehicles and Charging Infrastructure (Nov. 3, 2016), available at 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/11/03/obama-administration-announces-new-
actions-accelerate-deployment. 
225.  Id. 
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IV. INTERNATIONAL POLICY 
A. Innovation in the International Regime 
The challenges of addressing innovation snowballing are daunting for a 
single government. But the task becomes significantly more complicated 
when trying to coordinate across the globe. Innovations spread across the 
globe for many reasons, including international trade,226 foreign direct 
investment,227 the international migration of scientists228, and international 
scientific research collaborations.229 Though empirical work shows that 
technology diffusion “decays” with geographical distance,230 estimates 
suggest there is indeed a great deal of technology diffusion across 
borders.231 
Thus, how one nation innovates affects the direction of innovation for 
the rest of the world; countries’ directions of technological progress are 
interdependent. For example, if the United States produces more cleantech 
innovation, not only domestic but also global innovation will be redirected 
toward cleantech, further reducing the risk of climate change. Innovation 
snowballing is, in short, a global issue: individual countries can adopt 
cleantech innovation policies, but the total global response to climate 
change largely determines the direction of innovation. And, as noted 
earlier, experts believe that current global cleantech R&D spending levels 
are far below what is needed to transition to clean energy sources.232 
 
 
226.  Wolfgang Keller, International Technology Diffusion, 42 J. ECON. LITERATURE 752, 752 
(2004) (identifying imports as a “significant channel of technology diffusion.”). 
227.  Wolfgang Keller, International Trade, Foreign Direct Investment, and Technology 
Spillovers, in HANDBOOK OF THE ECONOMICS OF INNOVATION 796 (Bronwyn H. Hall & Nathan 
Rosenberg eds., 2010) (identifying foreign direct investment a key potential channel for international 
technology spillovers).  
228.  William R. Kerr, Ethnic Scientific Communities and International Technology Diffusion, 90 
REV. ECON. & STAT. 518, 518 (2008) (finding strong empirical evidence that U.S. ethnic scientific 
communities transfer technology and information to their home countries); Petra Moser et al., German 
Jewish Émigrés and US Invention, 104 AM. ECON. REV. 3222, 3222 (2014) (finding that German 
Jewish emigres to the United States during World War II substantially increased patenting by US 
inventors). 
229.  Valentina Bosetti et al., International Energy R&D Spillovers and the Economics of 
Greenhouse Gas Atmospheric Stabilization, 30 ENERGY ECON. 2912, 2913 (2008) (discussing how 
knowledge flows “circulate among world research laboratories, the so-called disembodied knowledge 
flows”). 
230.  Wolfgang Keller, Geographic Localization of International Technology Diffusion, 92 AM. 
ECON. REV. 120, 120 (2002) (finding that the “distance at which the amount of spillovers is halved is 
about 1,200 kilometers”). 
231.  See Keller, supra note 226, at 776 (underscoring the “significance of international 
technology diffusion,” based on a detailed survey of the economics literature). 
232.  See KERR & CHIAVARI, supra note 86 (describing these estimates). It is not obvious that 
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Furthermore, not only does each new “imported” cleantech innovation 
increase the productivity of other countries’ innovations in cleantech; it 
also increases their cleantech absorptive capacity, making it easier to 
appropriate future cleantech inventions.233 Research suggests that firms 
with more developed R&D programs tend to also be better at identifying 
and appropriating technological inventions produced by other firms.234 In 
other words, appropriating external innovation requires a certain level of 
skill, investment, and knowledge.235 At the country level, these differences 
in absorptive capacity translate into the uneven dispersion of knowledge, 
with international innovation spillovers tending to be larger for countries 
that spend more on domestic R&D and have more educated workforces.236 
Innovations diffuse across borders, redirecting technological 
development and changing countries’ abilities to absorb future 
developments. Countries’ paths of technological development are 
interdependent; the needed cleantech innovation snowball is largely a 
global one. The next subsection works out policy implications. 
B. Implications 
An optimal response to climate change would involve a global carbon 
tax to address the negative externality of greenhouse gas emissions and a 
global cleantech innovation subsidy to address innovation snowballing. 
Since no global government exists to implement the optimal policy and 
these are not realistic goals in today’s geopolitical climate, we instead 
examine how existing international frameworks could address innovation 
snowballing, as existing policies give the best guidance on what is feasible 
internationally. We concentrate our attention on three promising 
 
 
standard spillovers lead to underinvestment, since countries have motivations to invest in knowledge 
production that the conventional account fails to capture, like the production of local agglomeration 
economies. See Daniel J. Hemel & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Knowledge Goods and Nation-States, 
101 MINN. L. REV. 167, 175–76 (2016) (making this argument). The same argument could in principle 
apply to innovation snowballing, but the low current spending level suggest that the argument does not 
apply in this context. 
233.  For one of the first discussions of absorptive capacity, see Wesley M. Cohen & Daniel A. 
Levinthal, Innovation and Learning: The Two Faces of R&D, 99 ECON. J. 569, 569 (1989). 
234.  Cohen & Levinthal, supra note 233, at 569 (arguing that conducting R&D not only generates 
new information for the firm, but “also enhances the firm's ability to assimilate and exploit existing 
information”). 
235.  Bronwyn H. Hall, The Financing of Research and Development, 18 OXFORD REV. ECON. 
POL’Y 35, 35 (2002) (citing literature suggesting that the costs of acquiring external R&D can be quite 
high). 
236.  David T. Coe et al., International R&D Spillovers and Institutions 4 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. 
Research, Working Paper No. 14069, 2008) (finding with regression analysis that countries where the 
“quality of tertiary education systems are relatively high tend to benefit more” from international R&D 
spillovers). 
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international mechanisms: (1) the Paris Agreement, (2) knowledge-sharing 
platforms, and (3) international intellectual property rights. 
1. The Paris Agreement 
A historic accomplishment in climate negotiations, the Paris 
Agreement stands as the main international mechanism for addressing 
global warming in the near term. Innovation, however, does not feature 
prominently in the Agreement. Instead, the Agreement focuses primarily 
on emission reductions.237 Specifically, signatories submit Intended 
Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs), which detail the emission 
reductions that a country pledges to take. 238 The Agreement calls for the 
creation of reporting and monitoring mechanisms that will enable the 
public to track countries’ progress towards their individual targets.239 
Starting in 2020, signatories will return to the negotiating table to revisit 
their climate contributions, the theory being that the publicizing of INDC 
progress will pressure (or shame) countries into achieving and 
strengthening their emission-reduction pledges. 
Largely missing from Paris (and its predecessors) is the recognition that 
not all emission reductions are equal. The framework essentially equates 
an emission reduction due to closing a coal-fired power plant with an 
emission reduction resulting from innovation in solar technologies, even 
though the latter also helps build a cleantech innovation snowball. Indeed, 
the vast majority of submitted INDCs simply report climate targets as 
emission reductions relative to a baseline level—and most analysts have 
evaluated the ambitiousness of Paris by aggregating emission-reduction 
pledges.240 To be fair, the transparency framework for tracking Paris 
Agreement progress is still in the works,241 and there will likely be calls in 
the upcoming years for countries to add detail to and improve the quality 
 
 
237.  Suggestively, the word “emission” is used twenty-five times in the text of the main Paris 
Agreement; the word “innovation” is only used once. See Conference of the Parties, Adoption of the 
Paris Agreement, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2015/L.9 Art. 10 (Dec. 12, 2015). 
238.  For an overview of the Paris Agreement, see Savaresi, supra note 25, at 16.  
239.  Gregory Briner & Sara Moarif, Unpacking Provisions Related to Transparency of Mitigation 
and Support in the Paris Agreement 9 (Org. for Econ. Coop. and Dev., Climate Change Expert Grp., 
Paper No. 2016(2), 2016) (describing reporting and negotiation timeframes under the Paris 
Agreement). 
240.  See, e.g., Joeri Rogelj et al., Paris Agreement Climate Proposals Need a Boost to Keep 
Warming Well Below 2º Celsius, 534 NATURE 631, 631 (2016) (modeling the potential effects of 
INDC emission-reduction pledges on global temperatures). 
241.  Eliza Northrop & Melisa Krnjaic, After COP21: 7 Key Tasks to Implement the Paris 
Agreement, WORLD RESOURCES INST. (Mar. 4, 2016), http://www.wri.org/blog/2016/03/after-cop21-7-
key-tasks-implement-paris-agreement. 
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of their INDCs.242 But, the Agreement provides little guidance as to what 
information should be reported on domestic mitigation measures—
information that will be crucial to evaluating a country’s contribution to 
addressing innovation spillovers.243 Thus, apart from a side agreement 
called Mission Innovation that appears to have little prospect of leading to 
substantial increases in innovation support, how emissions are reduced 
appears secondary to the reduction itself.244 
Given the importance of innovation snowballing to optimal climate 
policy, two modifications could improve the Agreement’s focus on 
cleantech innovation. First, the transparency framework could be 
augmented to include an array of cleantech innovation indicators. For 
example, countries could be encouraged to report government funding of 
cleantech R&D, subsidization of cleantech adoption, and procurement of 
emergent cleantech—among other things. Other indicators might focus 
more on innovation outcomes, rather than inputs, such as numbers of 
cleantech patents filed per year or adoption rates of emergent technologies 
(appropriately normalized to, say, GDP). Since developed countries are 
required under the Paris Agreement to provide data on their climate 
finance to developing countries,245 the burdens of reporting additional data 
on cleantech innovation metrics (e.g., government R&D spending) would 
likely be minimal. But data on other potential indicators of cleantech 
innovation (e.g., deployment subsidies to cleantech) might be more 
 
 
242.  See, e.g., HARV. PROJECT ON CLIMATE AGREEMENTS, THE PARIS AGREEMENT AND 
BEYOND: INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY POST-2020 13 (Robert N. Stavins & Robert C. 
Stowe eds., 2016) (“It is essential to improve the quality of NDCs.”). 
243. Briner & Moarif, supra note 239, at 9 (noting that “it remains unclear what information is to 
be reported on domestic mitigation measures and what methodological consistency means in 
practice”). 
244.  In Mission Innovation, an initiative announced during the final weeks of the Paris 
negotiations, twenty-one countries pledged to double their public investment in clean energy R&D 
within five years. See MISSION INNOVATION SECRETARIAT, supra note 85, at 3. However, countries’ 
pledges are voluntary and nonbinding, and signatories can exit at any time. Id. at 4. Perhaps partly for 
this reason, there was little indication that countries were following through on their commitments 
under Mission Innovation, even before the election of President Trump. See Umair Irfan, A Grim 
Prognosis for Mission Innovation under Trump, E&E NEWS (Jan. 9, 2017), 
https://www.eenews.net/stories/1 060048035/ (observing that “the United States is already behind 
schedule on its journey to double clean energy R&D”). Another development was the creation of 
Breakthrough Energy Coalition, a $1 billion venture capital fund committed to investing in climate 
solutions that may take many years to yield results. See Kirsten Korosec, Bill Gates Is Heading a $1 
Billion Clean Energy Venture Fund, FORTUNE (Dec. 11, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/12/11/bill-
gates-john-doerr-venture-fund/. While helpful, the sums involved are small relative to what is needed, 
especially since the effective subsidy is far smaller than the total funding, since the investors expect to 
not only recoup their investment but also make a profit—just with a tolerance for risk and slow 
returns. 
245.  See U.N. Conference of the Parties, Adoption of the Paris Agreement, U.N. Doc. 
FCCC/CP/2015/L.9 Art. 9.7 (Dec. 12, 2015).  
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difficult to obtain, in which case qualitative descriptions of innovation 
policy may have to suffice. Ultimately, the goal of this proposal is to focus 
public and policy attention on the importance of cleantech innovation. If 
countries begin reporting on cleantech innovation metrics, then public 
pressure could—in line with the overall logic of the Paris model—induce 
countries to commit more resources toward cleantech innovation. 
Second, and relatedly, future negotiations could explicitly account for 
cleantech innovation by asking countries to submit a separate cleantech 
innovation INDC. Given the importance of innovation snowballing, the 
Paris Agreement could be restructured to require two INDCs: one 
pledging reductions in emissions, the other pledging increases in cleantech 
innovation. In short: two INDCs for the two important components in 
mitigating global climate change. While there may be substantial overlap 
in how a country plans to achieve each INDC (e.g., tax credits for wind 
not only induce greater cleantech innovation but also reduce total 
emissions), doing so would account for the fact that reductions through 
innovation are more valuable globally than those through cut-backs or 
switches to existing technology. 
At a minimum, a cleantech INDC could contain the following three 
features. First, comparable measurements of cleantech innovation 
investment would help promote a clearer understanding of countries’ 
contributions to the global cleantech knowledge stock. This task, however, 
would be tricky, as different governments will likely want different 
definitions of what constitutes cleantech. Comparability of metrics would 
support the second recommendation for a cleantech INDC: verification. 
Built upon a set of agreed-upon definitions of what constitutes cleantech 
support, external verification would pressure countries into achieving their 
voluntary cleantech targets. While not easy, such a restructuring could 
bring clarity, attention, and urgency to the problem of cleantech 
innovation spillovers. 
Third, private-sector innovation should be included in the cleantech 
INDCs. Snowballing comes from both public- and private-sector 
innovation. Indeed, the vast majority of cleantech innovation currently 
comes from the private sector.246 Countries may vary in a myriad of ways 
beyond public spending on cleantech that affect their contribution to 
cleantech innovation, including investments in K-12 and tertiary 
 
 
246.  Id. One example of a recent U.S. effort is the Breakthrough Energy Coalition, in which 
wealthy individuals committed funds for investment in cleantech with long-run financial payoffs. See 
Breakthrough Energy Coalition, BREAKTHROUGH ENERGY, http://www.b-t.energy/coalition/.com (last 
visited July 28, 2017) (describing group’s mission). 
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education, other human capital policies, tax policy (including not just 
R&D tax credits but also incentives to invest generally), land use policy 
(affecting the ease of deploying new renewable energy technologies), 
cultural norms, and the quality of the patent system. It would be difficult 
to track how these public policies contribute to cleantech innovation 
directly, making the total private contribution perhaps the best measure of 
how well public policy, outside of government funding, is deployed to 
encourage cleantech innovation. It would be problematic if inclusion of 
the private sector in reporting and commitments discouraged public-sector 
spending commitments, but including private-sector reporting could 
encourage diverse government policies and private-sector initiatives to 
promote cleantech development and at least paint a more accurate picture 
of the state of affairs, thereby drawing attention to the importance of 
private- sector innovation in developing cleantech. 
While the Paris Agreement can do more to support and encourage 
cleantech innovation, the Agreement does take some steps towards 
addressing innovation spillovers. As we discuss next, the Agreement’s 
creation of a cleantech knowledge sharing platform will induce some clean 
innovation. We celebrate these actions, even as we call attention to 
possible improvements. 
2. Knowledge Sharing Platforms 
The Paris Agreement most directly addressed innovation by pledging to 
strengthen the Technology Mechanism, a knowledge sharing platform that 
provides technical assistance to developing countries to adopt new climate 
technologies, expands global access to climate technology knowledge, and 
spurs collaborations among climate technology experts. As a result, the 
Paris Agreement continues the international community’s long tradition of 
promoting cleantech development and diffusion through voluntary cross-
border collaborations.247 Since the 1970s, for example, the International 
Energy Agency has administered a series of Technology Collaboration 
Programs: international research ventures in which member countries 
coordinate their R&D efforts and share findings on various emergent 
energy technologies.248 More recently, the United States established the 
Asia Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate: a voluntary 
 
 
247.  Heleen de Coninck et al., International Technology-Oriented Agreement to Address Climate 
Change, 36 ENERGY POL’Y 335, 336–37 (2008) (reviewing several prominent climate-related 
knowledge sharing platforms that pre-dated the Paris Agreement). 
248. For a comprehensive overview of these programs, see generally INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, 
TECHNOLOGY COLLABORATION PROGRAMMES: HIGHLIGHTS AND OUTCOMES (2016). 
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multilateral agreement that funded various joint cleantech demonstration 
projects.249 
Innovation snowballing underscores the value of these knowledge-
sharing, research-coordinating platforms, and suggests value in devoting 
further resources to strengthen them. All other things equal, it is most 
efficient to make knowledge freely available, since knowledge is nonrival, 
meaning a person’s use of knowledge does not interfere with another’s use 
of the same knowledge. That said, the acquisition and processing of 
knowledge involve transaction costs—and there likely are economies of 
scale in collecting, organizing, and digesting cleantech research. In light of 
these economies of scale, a private-sector company could gather, process, 
and disseminate cleantech information. But the company would charge 
more than the roughly zero cost of providing existing information to the 
marginal party. (Once collected, organized, and digested, the cost of 
posting information on a website is roughly zero for the marginal user, 
making the optimal price zero.) This inefficiency creates space for 
government intervention in coordinating the collection and dissemination 
of cleantech information through the creation of international knowledge 
sharing platforms. 
The reasoning laid out thus far applies to any knowledge. Two factors, 
however, make knowledge sharing platforms particularly valuable for 
cleantech. First, the absence of optimal global carbon taxes and research 
subsidies results in an insufficient transfer of cleantech know-how, and 
innovation snowballing makes the benefits of sharing cleantech 
knowledge even larger than they typically would be. Knowledge platforms 
help make up for some of that knowledge-transfer gap by reducing the 
costs of cleantech dissemination. That is, they function as a second-best 
policy in the absence of optimal innovation policy. 
Second, knowledge sharing platforms help prevent the rise of pollution 
havens, and therefore mitigate some of the particular concerns raised by 
innovation snowballing. For the reasons just discussed, well-designed 
knowledge sharing platforms reduce the transaction costs associated with 
knowledge diffusion. At the same time, these collaborations likely 
enhance the absorptive capacity of developing countries, as their scientists 
expand their cleantech know-how through interactions with scientists from 
other countries. Both of these effects, in turn, help accelerate the diffusion 
of cleantech knowledge blocks to areas of the world that have low 
 
 
249.  For an overview of the Partnership, see generally Noriko Fujiwara, The Asia-Pacific 
Partnership on Clean Development and Climate: What It Is and What It Is Not (Ctr. for European 
Pol’y Studies, Brief No. 144, 2007). 
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cleantech knowledge stocks and therefore are at greatest risk of becoming 
pollution havens. In other words, by making the cleantech knowledge 
stocks in the developing world more productive, knowledge sharing 
platforms mitigate some of the risk that ambitious cleantech policies 
enacted by innovation leaders (i.e., technology-exporting countries) might 
cause dirtytech to flee to innovation laggards (i.e., technology-importing 
countries).250 
3. International Intellectual Property Regime 
A number of international institutions seek to regulate or influence 
patent protection levels across the globe. The Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights Agreement (TRIPS), for instance, requires 
that all members of the World Trade Organization adopt a minimum set of 
intellectual property (IP) standards. Meanwhile, the United Nations 
created the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) to develop 
international IP rules and, more generally, work to protect IP rights across 
borders.251 And increasingly, bilateral and multilateral trade agreements—
such as the now defunct Trans-Pacific Partnership—have included IP 
provisions that go beyond the TRIPS minimum.252 
Much has been written on these efforts, and a comprehensive review of 
the literature on international IP policy lies beyond the scope of this 
Article. Nevertheless, as discussed in the domestic policy Part of this 
paper, innovation snowballing increases the costs of patents (since 
monopolization of knowledge becomes more problematic) and reduces the 
benefits of patents (since market valuation is less valuable and much of the 
benefit of cleantech does not directly accrue to its users). The same 
reasoning applies internationally. 
 
 
250.  Cross-border collaborations may amplify standard international innovation spillovers, 
thereby disincentivizing the production of domestic cleantech innovation. But these perverse effects 
will likely be small because governments do not require private firms to participate in knowledge 
sharing platforms. Indeed, many of these voluntary ventures do not even involve profit-maximizing 
companies, and instead involve researchers from government or university laboratories. (For example, 
the ITER project—an international collaboration that aims to prove the feasibility of fusion 
technologies—primarily involves publicly-funded scientists. See What is ITER, ITER, 
https://www.iter.org/proj/inafewlines (last visited July 28, 2017).) As a result, knowledge sharing 
platforms should have little to no impact on the private returns to R&D—and therefore little to no 
impact on private-sector investment levels in cleantech R&D. 
251. Inside WIPO, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., http://www.wipo.int/about-wipo/en/ (last visited 
Jun. 15, 2017). 
252.  For a concise review of these efforts, see Carlos A. Primo Braga, TPP: The New Gold 
Standard for Intellectual Property Protection in Trade Agreements?, HUFFINGTON POST: THE BLOG 
(Mar. 24, 2016, 10:35 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/eastwest-center/tpp-the-new-gold-
standard_b_9544428.html. 
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As a result, innovation snowballing increases the value of using tools 
other than patents to encourage global cleantech innovation. One 
possibility is establishing a global fund to purchase cleantech IP and place 
it in the public domain, as some have suggested.253 Such a move would 
preserve the positive incentives to innovate while encouraging innovation 
snowballing. Alternatively, a global climate prize or research grant fund 
could be established. In any case, innovation snowballing strengthens the 
argument of using public funding rather than strengthening international 
IP rules in the context of cleantech. 
V. POLITICAL ECONOMY 
Before concluding, we pause to consider whether our recommendation 
of refocusing some of the political effort to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions on innovation aligns with political economy considerations. 
Political economy factors largely reinforce the value of making innovation 
policy an integral part of climate policy. First, unlike carbon taxes, 
innovation commits future governments to long-term reductions in 
emissions that cannot easily be revoked: while a tax can be rolled back, it 
is difficult to “unlearn” innovation. Second, cleantech innovation policies 
can boost the chances that a carbon tax will be adopted, both because 
innovation lowers the costs of complying with a carbon tax and because 
innovation policies foster the growth of cleantech constituencies who will 
lobby for a carbon tax. Indeed, empirical research shows that subsidies for 
cleantech generally precede the adoption of carbon taxes. In addition to 
these political-economy benefits, there are good reasons to believe that 
increased cleantech spending would be popular and might be more 
politically feasible than carbon taxes. We discuss each of these points in 
turn. 
One political-economy benefit of innovation is that it cannot be rolled 
back by future governments. If public R&D spending, for example, leads 
to a technological breakthrough in battery storage, the breakthrough will 
remain even if federal funding is later discontinued. Similarly, the private-
sector benefits of participating in publicly-funded R&D ventures—
 
 
253.  The proposal to create a global fund for climate-related IP is not new. See, e.g., Reichman et 
al., supra note 147, at 24 (suggesting that UNFCCC and WIPO establish a joint fund to “buy out” key 
climate-focused IP and then “make the innovation available to others, especially developing 
countries”); Richard G. Newell, International Climate Technology Strategies, in POST-KYOTO 
INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE POLICY 403, 432 (Joseph E. Aldy & Robert N. Stavins eds., 2010) 
(suggesting that the World Bank establishes a “Strategic Technology Fund” that, among other things, 
would purchase climate-related intellectual property rights and place them in the public domain). 
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namely, new knowledge and new inventions—do not obviously depend on 
future public commitments to R&D. True, private companies may decide 
not to engage in a research project that depends heavily on future public 
funding, especially if they believe that these promised taxpayer dollars 
will not ultimately materialize. However, governments cannot reclaim 
public dollars that have already been spent on clean energy R&D, nor can 
they erase the new knowledge, discoveries, or inventions generated as a 
result of this funding. Thus, from the perspective of a private firm, the 
benefits of participating in an innovation subsidy program are durable and 
largely independent of government commitments to future action. 
In contrast, carbon pricing faces a notable credibility problem, since the 
continuing existence of such a regime depends on the behavior of future 
governments and future voters.254 Today’s pledges to reduce emissions can 
always be revoked by tomorrow’s politicians.255 This concern factors into 
both international and domestic climate policy: policymakers wish to bind 
other countries (in the international case) and future political leaders (in 
the domestic case) to emission-reduction commitments made today. But 
companies investing in cleantech capital and R&D in response to a 
pollution tax run the risk that future politicians will renege on their climate 
promises, thereby saddling firms with sunk costs that they originally 
expected to recover through a non-zero price on carbon.256 Thus, while the 
benefits of an innovation subsidy are certain and secure, the benefits of 
investing in cleantech innovation under a carbon pricing scheme hinge on 
politicians’ willpower to follow through on their policy commitments.257 
Historical experience suggests that firms have good reason to be wary 
of political promises on energy policy. Australia, for example, reversed the 
nation’s carbon tax following a transfer of power between political 
parties,258 thereby upending an earlier promise to price carbon until at least 
 
 
254.  For an extensive survey of this topic, see Steffen Brunner et al., Credible Commitment in 
Carbon Policy, 12 CLIMATE POL’Y 255 (2012). 
255.  Indeed, some have argued that it may be welfare maximizing for governments to renege on 
their carbon commitments after firms have sunk investments into emission-mitigating infrastructure 
and technologies. See, e.g., Lisandro Abrego & Carlo Perroni, Investment Subsidies and Time-
Consistent Environmental Policy, 54 OXFORD ECON. PAPERS 617, 617–18 (2002). 
256.  Dieter Helm et al., Credible Carbon Policy, 19 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 438, 439 (2003) 
(arguing that the “profitability of such carbon-reducing investments is highly sensitive to carbon 
policy”). 
257.  Lion Hirth, Governance Under Time Inconsistency and Limited Credibility: What Can Be 
Learned from Monetary Policy for Climate Policy? (Univ. of Tübingen & Potsdam-Inst. for Climate 
Impact Research, Working Paper, 2009) (arguing that policies that establish property rights, like 
research subsidies, are more credible than carbon prices). 
258.  Michelle Innis, Environmentalists Denounce Repeal of Australia’s Carbon Tax, N.Y. TIMES 
(July 17, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/18/world/asia/environmentalists-decry-repeal-of-
australias-carbon-tax.html. 
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2050.259 Likewise, several countries have reduced their gasoline taxes in 
response to rising energy costs, suggesting that carbon taxes might also be 
vulnerable to fluctuations in electricity prices.260 Case in point: British 
Columbia’s carbon tax became a target for political opponents following a 
sudden rise in gasoline prices.261 The surprise election of President Donald 
Trump further highlights the perils of relying on government pricing 
schemes. Firms that began preparing for the rollout of President Obama’s 
Clean Power Plan—a regulation that would have required the power sector 
to reduce carbon emissions by about a third below 2005 levels262—may 
now find themselves at a competitive disadvantage, as President Trump 
has promised to dismantle the Plan.263 
In addition to commitment benefits, innovation boosts the chances of a 
carbon tax being adopted in two ways: by reducing its compliance costs 
and by building a constituency for the policy. In particular, innovation can 
lower the compliance costs of future carbon emission regulations by 
making clean energy cheaper. In the past, governments have balked at 
enforcing regulatory standards deemed too costly by industry.264 For 
example, in response to industry pushback during the 1990s, California 
progressively weakened a zero-emission vehicle mandate that required car 
manufacturers to sell a certain percentage of electric automobiles.265 
Today’s investments in innovation, however, promise to reduce 
tomorrow’s clean energy costs, making future carbon prices less 
burdensome to industry and therefore more palatable to politicians. 
Second, and relatedly, cleantech subsidies can help develop and expand 
 
 
259.  Int’l Ctr. for Trade and Sustainable Dev., Australia Repeals Carbon Tax, BRIDGES WKLY., 
July 17, 2014, at 7, available at https://www.ictsd.org/sites/default/files/review/bridgesweekly18-
26.pdf. 
260.  Hirth, supra note 257 (describing how government-induced increases in gasoline prices 
created huge political backlash in Venezuela and Germany). 
261.  For a fascinating analysis of the political economy underlying British Columbia’s carbon 
tax, see Kathryn Harrison, The Political Economy of British Columbia’s Carbon Tax, (Org. for Econ. 
Coop. and Dev., Env’t Working Paper No. 63, 2013). 
262.  ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, THE CLEAN POWER PLAN: OVERVIEW OF THE CLEAN POWER 
PLAN (2015), available at https://19january2017snapshot.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-
08/documents/fs-cpp-overview.pdf. 
263.  For one perspective on the effects of the Supreme Court’s stay of the Clean Power Plan on 
the business community, see Thomas Covert, The Clean Power Plan ‘Stay’ Could Slow Clean Energy 
Progress, FORBES (Apr. 25, 2016 9:30 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ucenergy/2016/04/25/the-
clean-power-plan-stay-could-slow-clean-energy-progress/ - 133da33d18ea.  
264.  See, e.g., Stewart, supra note 9, at 1302–03 (describing the repeated postponement of 1970 
air emission standards for new automobiles). 
265.  See Gary E. Marchant, Complexity and Anticipatory Socio-Behavioral Assessment of 
Government Attempts to Induce Clean Technologies, 61 UCLA L. REV 1858, 1863–69 (2014) 
(describing the history of the California Zero Emission Vehicle program). 
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cleantech constituencies. It is in the interest of these cleantech groups to 
lobby for stronger climate change policies, including carbon pricing 
regulations.266 In this way, cleantech innovation policies can catalyze a 
positive feedback loop that leads to stricter and stricter climate regulations. 
Notably, some economists and political scientists argue that cleantech 
subsidies are more effective than carbon pricing at stimulating the growth 
of cleantech coalitions.267 This hypothesis builds on a long line of political 
economy research suggesting that interest groups are strongest when they 
consist of a small number of members who seek to either hold onto a large 
benefit or avoid a sizeable cost.268 When regulatory impacts are big and 
concentrated, the payoffs to political action are more likely to justify the 
high upfront costs of lobbying, while the potential for free-riding is 
minimized since smaller groups can more easily monitor their members. In 
contrast, when regulatory costs or benefits are small and diffuse, collective 
action problems loom large and the cost-benefit calculus for lobbying 
weighs in favor of political inaction. 
As a result, a strong carbon tax is less likely to pass in the absence of a 
powerful cleantech coalition, since a carbon price imposes concentrated 
costs on an entrenched fossil fuel industry while generating diffuse 
benefits for the public at large.269 And many researchers agree that a robust 
cleantech coalition cannot be expected to form around a modest carbon 
tax, as such a policy will not meaningfully redirect innovation and capital 
towards emerging or established cleantech.270 In contrast, government 
innovation subsidies can confer concentrated benefits to cleantech firms, 
while imposing indirect and dispersed costs on fossil fuel companies and 
the public at large. The political economy calculus is therefore reversed: 
innovation subsidies give cleantech firms a strong incentive to organize 
politically, while mitigating the risks of a dirtytech political response. At 
the same time, cleantech subsidies help cleantech industries grow and, as a 
 
 
266.  For a concise overview of this argument, see Meckling et al., supra note 26.  
267.  Id. at 1170; Jonas Meckling & Gernot Wagner, Policy Sequencing Toward Decarbonization 
(2016) (unpublished) (on file with author). 
268.  For the seminal work on this issue, see generally MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF 
COLLECTIVE ACTION (1965).  
269.  Meckling & Wagner, supra note 267 (explaining that carbon pricing is often met with strong 
economic opposition because the benefits of such a policy are diffuse while the costs are 
concentrated). 
270.  Indeed, carbon pricing’s potential to stimulate green innovation may be undermined by the 
credibility problems described above. See Newell, supra note 253, at 417–418 (stressing that the long-
term credibility of a carbon tax is critical to its effectiveness at inducing cleantech innovation). Thus, 
in light of the uncertainty surrounding greenhouse gas emission regimes in general, even strong 
commitments to reduce emissions might not be enough to induce meaningful investments in cleantech 
and build strong green industry coalitions.  
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result, become more politically powerful and more capable of persuading 
government to enact stricter climate policies, including a tax on carbon.271 
In theory then, public R&D spending, feed-in tariffs (in which 
governments guarantee a certain payment to energy producers), renewable 
portfolio standards, and other so-called cleantech “industrial” policies 
offer a politically feasible mechanism for mobilizing and expanding the 
cleantech coalition.272 
And indeed, in practice, cleantech industrial policies predate the vast 
majority of today’s existing carbon pricing regimes. According to a recent 
study by Jonas Meckling and Gernot Wagner, at least 132 countries and 
subnational jurisdictions installed either a feed-in tariff or a renewable 
portfolio standard for their power sector by 2014.273 During the same time 
period, however, only fifty-two carbon tax or cap-and-trade systems were 
implemented (or scheduled for enactment)—and most of these imposed 
relatively weak prices on carbon emissions.274 The authors calculate that 
nearly two-thirds of carbon pricing schemes in the power sector benefited 
from an earlier feed-in tariff or renewable portfolio standard. They find a 
similar policy progression in the transportation sector, where twelve 
governments have adopted a pricing system for transport emissions, as 
compared to ninety-nine jurisdictions that have adopted either a biofuel 
mandate or electric vehicle incentives. While this work documents 
correlation (not causation) and primarily focuses on deployment subsidies 
(rather than direct R&D subsidies), it suggests that innovation policies can 
serve as stepping stones to subsequent carbon taxes.275 
In the U.S. context, the political advantages of innovation policies over 
carbon pricing seem particularly pronounced. While several states and 
localities have considered a tax on carbon, only a few have enacted one.276 
At the national level, efforts to legislate a national price on carbon have 
repeatedly failed, the most notorious example being the Waxman-Markey 
cap-and-trade bill that died in the Senate after passing the House in 
 
 
271.  Meckling & Wagner, supra note 267 (arguing that “[t]argeted industrial and innovation 
policies, such as direct renewable energy subsidies, more easily mobilize political support by 
providing benefits to economic winners”). 
272.  Llewelyn Hughes & Johannes Urpelainen, Interests, Institutions, and Climate Policy: 
Explaining the Choice of Policy Instruments for the Energy Sector, 54 ENVTL. SCI. & POL’Y 52, 53–54 
(2015) (explaining that, while carbon pricing may be more effective than industrial policies at 
greenhouse gas mitigation, it is also more politically expensive). 
273.  Meckling & Wagner, supra note 267. 
274.  Id. 
275.  Id. 
276.  For a list of state and local carbon tax initiatives, see generally States, CARBON TAX CTR., 
http://www.carbontax.org/states/ (last visited July 28, 2017). 
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2009.277 Indeed, enacting any increase in federal taxes—much less one 
related to a politically charged issue like climate change—seems 
improbable in today’s highly polarized Congress.278 Nor does it appear 
that Republicans, who have staunchly opposed carbon pricing in recent 
years, will change their tune in the near future. Case in point: the 2016 
Republican Platform unequivocally opposes “any carbon tax.”279 The 
election of President Donald Trump has therefore likely extinguished any 
hope of establishing a national carbon tax in the next four years.280 
Cleantech innovation spending, in contrast, might offer an opportunity 
for bipartisan consensus. To begin, opinion polls consistently find broad 
public support for government spending on scientific research and 
development.281 And the polls that have asked specifically about energy 
R&D find similarly positive responses. For example, in one 2011 national 
poll, sixty-eight percent of participants supported “increasing federal 
funding for research on wind, solar and hydrogen energy technology.” 282 
As well, a number of Republican lawmakers have recently expressed 
support for government energy R&D.283 For example, the Advanced 
Research Project Agency-Energy (often called “ARPA-E”)—which 
conducts research primarily in low-carbon energy technologies—has 
 
 
277.  Carl Hulse & David M. Herszenhorn, Democrats Call off Effort for Climate Bill in Senate, 
N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 2010 (reporting on the failure of the Waxman-Markey bill). 
278.  Timothy Cama, GOP to Rule Out Carbon Tax, THE HILL (June 8, 2016, 6:00 AM), 
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FIXGOV (July. 24, 2016), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/fixgov/2016/07/24/democrats-and-
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change). 
280.  Interestingly, even Democratic Presidential nominee, Hillary Clinton, hesitated to endorse 
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politically toxic. David Roberts, WikiLeaks Reveals that Clinton Considered a Carbon Tax—But Her 
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research”); Roberts, supra note 280 (noting that many polls show widespread support for R&D 
spending). 
282.  Partisan Divide over Alternative Energy Widens, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Nov. 18, 2011), 
http://www.people-press.org/2011/11/10/partisan-divide-over-alternative-energy-widens/ (last visited 
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2011). 
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enjoyed strong bipartisan support.284 In fact, the Republican-controlled 
Congress has increased the project’s budget by more than half over the 
past five years.285 None of this is to say that increased spending on 
cleantech R&D would not face headwinds. But there are hopeful signs 
about its feasibility and about the long-term political-economy benefits of 
adopting such policies.286 
CONCLUSION 
The conventional thinking on innovation in environmental law is to 
impose a pollution tax—and then let the market and general innovation 
policy do the rest. The government, in other words, should not be in the 
business of directly encouraging cleantech innovation. This Article 
unsettles that conventional view, arguing that a policy of carbon taxation 
plus general innovation policy may be a far from optimal way of 
addressing the climate crisis. Rather, in light of innovation snowballing, 
the government should encourage cleantech over dirtytech and some forms 
of cleantech over other types of cleantech. This argument suggests that 
environmental policy should return to its early goal of directly 
encouraging environmentally friendly technology, though not through 
command-and-control regulations but rather through targeted innovation 
policies. 
Innovation snowballing also has several important implications for the 
design of those innovation policies. For example, it increases the value of 
government-set innovation tools, like prizes and grants, while decreasing 
the usefulness of market-based instruments, like patents and R&D tax 
credits. It also alters the cost-benefit analysis of other climate-related 
programs. For instance, deployment subsidies—such as tax credits for 
installing solar panels—look better in light of innovation snowballing, 
since these subsidies help close the cleantech-dirtytech innovation gap. 
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Similar implications follow for the international climate regime. In 
particular, future climate accords should consider encouraging emissions 
reductions through innovation rather than the adoption of existing 
technology or cuts in production. 
This Article underscores the importance of dynamics in making climate 
policy—that is, of thinking not only about how a given policy will lead to 
short- or medium-run changes in emissions, but also about how policies 
will lead to long-term changes in technology equilibria. While earlier 
emissions reductions are, all else equal, more desirable, this Article gives 
important reasons for focusing in the near term on pushing cleantech over 
the tipping point of being cheaper than dirtytech, after which cleantech 
innovation will take off without additional government subsidization. This 
lesson of heavily investing in cleantech R&D now holds as a matter of 
politics as well: an innovation policy that specifically encourages 
cleantech has strong political economy benefits, since innovation cannot 
be repealed and since cleantech policies foster constituencies that will 
demand more robust climate policies, including stricter carbon taxes. 
Finally, the Article shows how innovation snowballing can affect 
innovation policy beyond the environmental sphere. It articulates two 
criteria for when these spillovers justify government intervention, namely: 
(1) there is a policy reason to redirect innovation away from one 
technology and toward another, and (2) the competing technologies are 
sufficiently substitutable. For example, for those concerned about income 
inequality, it might be efficient to redirect innovation from capital-
augmenting technologies toward labor-augmenting technologies—e.g., 
from prescription drugs (which use a lot of capital and little low-income 
labor) to tools that make home healthcare aides more productive (thereby 
benefitting aides, who are predominately low-income workers). But 
additional research will be required to determine where innovation 
snowballing merits government intervention. For now, innovation 
snowballing gives scholars and policymakers good reason to make 
innovation policy a core part of climate policy. By deploying innovation 
policy tools alongside traditional pollution regulations and carbon taxes, 
local, state, national, and world leaders can build an efficient climate 
policy that reduces emissions at a low and politically feasible cost. 
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